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PURPOSE OF STUDY 
This thesis examines how excess cash holdings affect firm and investor behavior in equity 
financed mergers and acquisitions. The theoretical framework for the study has been set based on 
research on firm capital structure and M&A outcomes. It therefore builds on a solid theoretical 
base, where optimality is seen as a basis for rational behavior. Equity financing has strong 
signaling effects, which have been reported to diminish shareholder value in the short-term 
especially if irrationally exercised. Reflecting on the selection of cash holdings, firms are subject 
to stronger signaling effects as essentially they provide a less expensive form of financing. In 
light of the prevailing theory, I intend to provide results that capture these effects in European 
context, while enabling comparison of domicile and cross-border M&A cases and the 
implications of different legislations.   
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
I gather mainly two different samples in order to first measure excess cash reserves and secondly 
to inspect how they are translated into a sample consisting purely of equity financed acquisitions 
in the EU-15 countries. I use ThomsonReuters and SDC to retrieve the data for M&A cases 
occurring in 1999-2010. I primarily use OLS multivariate and Logit regressions to test the impact 
of excess cash reserves on M&A announcement effects, probability of using equity, and post-
acquisition performance. Further, account for outliers and sampling bias by winsorising and the 
Heckman two-stage model respectively. 
RESULTS 
The results provide strong support for my hypothesis. Excess cash tends to have strong signaling 
effects on bidder cumulative abnormal returns, where the relation is significantly negative. I also 
provide evidence that lowering levels of information asymmetry off-sets this effect, as 
uncertainty about the bidder valuation levels is lowered. The probability of using equity in M&A 
cases is similarly negatively related to excess cash reserves. This effect is highlighted in market 
conditions that are more favorable, i.e. valuation levels are higher. Differentiating between 
country legislation builds on the finding, as higher investor protection increases the probability of 
using equity but simultaneously the adverse selection cost is emphasized. Post-acquisition 
operating performance is shown to be improved with higher excess cash ratios. Cash reserve 
levels are shown to decrease during the first years after the transaction, converging therefore 
towards normal levels. 
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TUTKIELMAN TAVOITTEET 
Tutkielmassa tarkastellaan ylimääräisten kassavarantojen vaikutusta yritysten ja sijoittajien 
käyttäytymiseen, kun kyseessä on omalla pääomalla rahoitetut yrityskaupat. Teoreettinen 
viitekehys pohjautuu tutkimuksiin, jotka käsittelevät yrityksen pääomarakennetta ja yritysostojen 
tuloksia. Taustalla on laaja teoreettinen pohja, jossa nähdään optimaalisuuden olevan perustana 
rationaaliseen käyttäytymiseen. Pääomarahoituksen muodoista oman pääoman ehtoisella 
rahoituksella on voimakas signalointivaikutus, jonka on raportoitu vähentävän omistajien arvoa 
lyhyellä aikavälillä, erityisesti mikäli sitä on käytetty epärationaalisesti. Kassavarantojen tasojen 
valinnan myötä yritykset omaksuvat vahvempia signalointivaikutuksia, jotka tulee huomioida 
rahoituspäätöksissä. Vallitsevan teorian huomioonottaen esitän tuloksia, jotka käsittelevät näitä 
vaikutuksia Euroopassa. Vertailen myös maiden sisällä tapahtuvia ja maantieteelliset rajat 
ylittäviä yrityskauppoja ja siten tutkin eri lainsäädäntöjärjestelmien vaikutusta niihin. 
LÄHDEAINEISTO JA MENETELMÄT 
Käytän pääosin kahta eri otosta, jotta ensiksi pystyn arvioimaan määritelmän ylimääräisistä 
käteisvaroista ja toiseksi tarkastamaan, miten nämä heijastuvat puhtaasti omalla pääomalla 
rahoitettuihin yritysostoihin EU-15 maissa. Tiedot on kerätty ThomsonReuters ja SDC -
hakemistoista kattaen yritysostot aikaväliltä 1999 - 2010. Olen ensisijaisesti käyttänyt OLS 
monimuuttuja ja Logit regressioita testatakseni ylimääräisten kassavarantojen vaikutuksia 
yrityskaupan ilmoitusvaikutukseen, todennäköisyyteen käyttää omaa pääomaa, sekä yrityskaupan 
jälkeiseen suorituskykyyn. Lisäksi huomioidakseni vieraiden havaintojen osuuden ja 
otosmenetelmän virheen käytän winsorising-menetelmää and Heckman kaksi-vaihe mallia. 
TULOKSET 
Tulokset tukevat vahvasti hypoteesejani. Ylimääräisillä kassavarannoilla on vahva 
signalointivaikutus ostavan yrityksen kumulatiivisiin epänormaaleihin tuottoihin, joissa suhde on 
huomattavan negatiivinen. Osoitan myös, että alentamalla tiedon epäsymmetrisyyden määrää 
voidaan tätä negatiivista vaikutusta vähentää, sillä epävarmuus ostajan arvostustasosta laskee. 
Ylimääräisten kassavarantojen kasvaessa oman pääoman käytön todennäköisyys yrityskaupoissa 
laskee. Tämä vaikutus korostuu edullisessa markkinatilanteessa, jossa arvostustasot ovat 
korkeammat. Eri maiden lainsäädännön merkitys puolestaan heijastuu siten, että korkeampi 
sijoittajansuoja lisää todennäköisyyttä käyttää omaa pääomaa, muta samalla korostuu haitallisen 
valikoitumisen kustannukset. Yrityskaupan jälkeisen toiminnan tehokkuus osoitetaan olevan 
parempi ylimääräisten kassavarantojen kasvaessa. Kassavarantojen taso osoitetaan olevan 
laskevia yrityskaupan jälkeen, jolloin ne lähestyvät normaalitasoa. 
AVAINSANAT 
Yrityskauppa, yritysosto, fuusio, haitallinen valikoituminen, tiedon epäsymmetria, 
pääomarakenne, kassavaranto, varovaisuuden periaate, maksutapa. 
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I. Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
 
Several mergers and acquisitions related research has focused on studying methods of payment 
and share price announcement effects, both for cross-border and domestic M&As. Findings vary 
significantly over time and across geographical focus, however a series of common fundamentals 
have been established: 1) equity financed transactions imply lower share price returns around the 
announcement date (Myers and Majluf, 1984); 2) full equity offers are more likely to be extended 
and accepted during equity market highs (Choe, Masulis, Nande, 1993); 3) method of payment 
does not affect the operating performance of the combined entity post-acquisition (Healy et al., 
1999). Reflecting on theory and previous literature, the frames for this study are set relatively 
conscientiously: equity financed transactions are expected to have negative share price 
announcement effects, increase in probability at market highs, and create no operational value 
after the acquisition on average. The thesis builds on an understanding that firms having cash and 
marketable securities on their balance sheets, which exceed the required amount to finance daily 
operations, do not create value for shareholders. The return on cash is significantly lower than the 
required rate of return on equity. Therefore, it would be understandable to deploy these low 
return assets in ventures that provide higher returns. For some reason in situations where this cash 
could be deployed, firms haphazardly decide not to – instead they use more expensive sources of 
finance. The question is: Why do firms use equity financing if internal funds are also available? 
 
In the presence of capital market imperfections deriving from asymmetric information between 
managers and capital providers, liquidity may be considered to be in a strategic role. Financial 
flexibility in the form of excess cash reserve may convey 1) growth opportunities; 2) stability 
through economic downturns; 3) guard against the underinvestment
1
 problems caused by 
expensive external financing, which are seen valuable for shareholders. Firms that experience 
high growth prospects and need a high level of liquidity to ensure corporate flexibility, are 
                                                 
1
 The underinvestment occurs because there are realized project payoffs that cover the investment expenditure at the 
time of the investment but not the investment expenditure  and the promised payment on leverage at later dates 
(Myers 1977). 
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expected to act against established corporate finance theories. Cash reserves do, however, induce 
an adverse selection cost by sending a stronger signal of overvaluation when equity financing is 
used. It is this signal that my thesis addresses. 
 
This study is motivated by the study conducted by Gao (2011) and reflects results on his findings. 
In his study, Gao (2011) explores the effects of excess cash ratio of bidder announcement effects 
and the relation between excess cash reserves and equity financing. Based on a US sample, the 
author finds evidence that announcement effects and probability of using equity as a method of 
payment is negatively related to excess cash reserves. He also finds that post-acquisition 
performance improves along the cash richness of the bidder prior to the M&A case.  
 
1.2. Contribution to existing literature 
 
The aim of the paper is to study EU-15 firms’ liquidity and its relation to M&A outcomes. 
Fundamentally I differentiate between firms with excess cash reserves and non-cash rich firms, in 
order to test theories such as adverse selection of cash reserve and asymmetries of information. 
Adding to the vast amount of literature on the topic, I provide results for the EU-15 countries and 
apply methods that capture market irrationality and two-sided asymmetries of information 
according to Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) and Shleifer and Vishny (2003). I find that 
the methodology Gao (2011) uses adds to the existing literature, with close reference to Harford 
(2005), by inspecting equity financed transactions. Gao (2011) uses a US based sample and 
inspects acquisitions during the period 1990-2005. Hence, I bring a more contemporary data set 
with a different geographical focus. In addition, I provide robustness tests that account for the 
growth opportunities that are prevalent in certain market conditions and industry cycles.  
 
A majority of previous literature has focused on the US and UK. By inspecting a European-wide 
sample of M&A, the thesis contributes to the existing literature, as it allows the evaluation of the 
impact of a wide range of institutional settings and legal and regulatory rules on the pattern of 
M&A activity. Having a sample consisting of several different countries enables me also to 
consider cross-border acquisitions from a very specific perspective. In comparison to the US and 
UK, Continental European firms are characterized by weaker investor protection and less 
developed capital markets (La Porta et al., 1998) and by more concentrated ownership structure 
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(Faccio and Lang, 2002). EU directives on M&A have harmonized regulation across the EU-15 
countries, but there still exists differences in implementation. The same provisions applied in the 
UK, where shareholder rights are paramount, and in the rest of Europe, where corporate 
governance is dominated by stakeholders, are largely debated in the EU. The lack of experience 
by national authorities in evaluating complex transactions, the independence of regulatory 
agencies, and the degree of explicit or implicit government involvement are clear barriers to a 
homogeneous implementation of rules across countries. The thesis provides a unique insight on 
the differences between the two legislative areas, where both firm and investor behavior is 
confined to the two distinct areas. 
 
1.3 Research question and main findings 
 
As stated, M&A is a well-studied area of finance, but certain aspects require more scrutiny, 
especially in the European context. Building on the existing theories and research results, I 
provide insights on three main concentration areas: 1) the announcement effect of fully stock 
financed acquisitions; 2) the probability of fully financing acquisitions with stock, 3) the post-
transaction operating performance and uses of funds. Differentiating between different market 
conditions and different legislative areas, the thesis engages in answering the possible differences 
in results for different environments.  
 
In my study, I provide results that highlight the impact of excess cash holdings on firm and 
investor behavior. The results are achieved through OLS and Logit regression, Wald tests, 
Ranksum tests, and Heckman two-stage tests. First, I find that excess cash reserves are negatively 
related to the announcement effect of equity financed bidders at 1 percent significance. The 
impact is more pronounced in hot equity markets than in non-hot equity markets, which portray 
the overvaluation component of the market that is signaled through equity bids. The effect is also 
shown to be emphasized in legislative areas with higher investor protection, i.e. in areas where 
equity financing is used more likely. When the probability of using equity is tested, the excess 
cash reserve variable is highly significant and negative. Therefore probability of using equity is 
lower when internal, cheaper funds are available. The finding conveys rationality in firm 
behavior. Third, the operating performance improves along bidder cash richness, which implies 
that the higher synergies are expected following the weaker announcement effect. Overall, the 
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results presented in this study have both complementary and contradictory aspects regarding the 
theoretical frameworks that I construct in Section 2.  
 
1.4 Limitations of the study 
 
There are three main limitations to this study that act as constraints when evaluating the 
applicability of the results presented in this study. First, the availability of M&A data and firm 
related metrics are constrained to the data sources. Securities Data Company (SDC) Mergers and 
Acquisitions database limits the geographical diversity of the sample used in this study. For an 
unknown reason, the amount of M&A activity is unproportionally high for the United Kingdom 
as observations for smaller countries are lacking. Further, the number of observations for smaller 
countries is not consistent with the distribution of M&A activity. Therefore, the sample is slightly 
biased towards countries where transactions are recorded with higher precision. Similarly, I use 
ThomsonReuters database to retrieve firm financials, where observations are sensitive to the 
accuracy and correctness of firm coding. Again, for some smaller countries there exists a 
relatively lower ‘hit ratio’ in finding sufficient information. This consequently makes country 
level comparisons difficult to perform. However, I find that the sample used is sufficiently large 
and a fair representation of firm behavior in the EU.  
 
Second, even though I use a sample starting from the year 1999 (the year the Euro was 
introduced to the world financial markets as an accounting currency) there is heterogeneity 
between country legislation developments during the past 12 years. The impact of these changes 
in country legislation is impossible to fully account for. I perform tests that include country and 
year differences, which are seen to be sufficient measures to incorporate this effect. Further, I 
differentiate between Code and Common Law countries to test for differences across various 
legislations. 
 
Third, an important variable in explaining decisions on method of payment in M&A cases is 
excluded from this study. Corporate control (elaborated on in Section 2.3.1) is excluded due to 
the hand picking nature of the variable. Including over 3,000 acquisitions in the specific test 
where management ownership would be used as an explanatory variable, makes hand picking a 
data collection method that is not seen feasible. 
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1.5 Structure of paper 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides theoretical background and 
previous literature on the topic. Section III introduces the reader to the European legislative 
environment elaborating on differences between countries from an M&A perspective. Section IV 
introduces my hypotheses based on the existing theories and previous findings. The following 
section focuses on elaborating on the methods and data used to conduct the analysis. Section VI 
presents empirical observations of excess cash reserves, deal announcement effects, equity 
financing in M&A cases, and post-transaction operating performance. Section VII presents 
rationale for robustness analysis and implications on the reported findings. Section VIII 
concludes the research and suggests further research on the subject. 
II. Theory and Previous Literature 
 
2.1 Capital structure 
 
The financing decisions made by companies are tightly related to the capital structures they 
decide to uphold. Finding the optimal levels of equity and debt has been an area of interest for 
researchers for decades. Myers (1984) and Myers & Majluf (1984) suggest that financing 
requirements are met in an order of choice, where the different financing possibilities are divided 
into three classes: 1) internal funds; 2) debt issuance; 3) equity issuance. According to the 
Pecking Order theory, financing behavior is driven by adverse selection costs. The costs are 
increasing with class, so that both debt and equity have premiums relative to retained earnings, 
equity having the most adverse selection cost due to its riskiness for the outside investor. 
Managers may be forced to forgo profitable projects if internal funds are not sufficient to finance 
the optimal investment program and information asymmetry is prohibitive. In this situation, 
financial slack is valuable, and the only opportunity to issue equity without the loss of market 
value occurs if information asymmetry is nonexistent or small. This idea captures the notion of 
time-varying adverse selection costs (discussed further in Section 2.2.1).  
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A rival theory to the Pecking Order theory, the Trade-Off theory, suggests that increasing 
leverage levels are beneficial for the company value until a certain point. Once the costs of 
financial distress exceed the tax benefits gained from increasing leverage, the company value 
starts to decrease. Several authors, including Schwartz and Aronson (1967), have documented 
strong industry effects in debt ratios, which can be interpreted as evidence of optimal ratios. 
Optimal capital structure research is broadly defined by the findings of Miller and Modigliani 
(1958), who detected the positive effects of interest tax shields in market valuations. This way of 
thinking has contributed to the Static Trade-off theory, which suggests target debt levels for 
firms. It introduces an incentive to adjust the capital structure to deviances from the optimal level. 
After a short-term shock in the capital structure, being weighted either to debt or equity, there 
exists pressure to return to the pre-shock capital structure. Taggart (1977), Marsh (1982), 
Auerbach (1984) and Jalilvand and Harris (1984) find mean reversion in debt ratios and show 
that firms appear to adjust toward a debt target. 
 
Theoretically, the Static Trade-off theory may be considered more versatile than the Pecking 
Order hypothesis because the theory accommodates the propensity to use debt and equity, which 
the Pecking Order theory considers to be irrelevant. The theory implies that in addition to the 
cash flow deficit, other characteristics such as expected growth, size, leverage and assets with 
collateral value which can be used to secure debt may affect the use of debt by firms. Therefore, 
at the theoretical level, the main difference between the Pecking Order theory and the Trade-off 
theory is the suggestion that there are other factors than the flow of funds deficit that affect the 
decision of firms to use debt. The theory suggests that firms which have the same deficit may 
desire to use different amounts of debt because of differences in their size, leverage and asset 
structure. Leary and Roberts (2010) provide evidence that fewer than 20 percent of firms follow 
the Pecking Order’s predictions concerning debt and equity issuance decisions. Only when they 
allow firms’ debt capacity to vary with variables attributed to the Trade-off theory, does the 
predictive ability of the pecking order improve significantly. This finding is in-line with the 
comments. 
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2.2 Adverse selection of cash reserve 
 
2.2.1 Theoretical background for the adverse selection effect of corporate cash reserve 
 
Firms may hold significant amounts of liquidity for a variety of reasons. One of the most 
recognized motives is to minimize transaction costs. Vickson (1985) and Penttinen (1991) 
performed well-developed stochastic programming models to identify optimal cash reserve levels 
reflecting on the pecking order framework established by Myers (1984). This literature also 
contributes to research by showing that there are economies of scale on cash management and 
specifying how much cash a firm will hold on average. Another reason for holding liquid assets 
is to maintain funding for positive net present value projects also in situations when cash flows 
are too low. Information asymmetries and agency costs are emphasized in economic troughs as 
firm performance might be a reflection of the economic situation or internal reasons such as 
exhausted growth opportunities. Here external financing is expensive and a reserve of liquid 
assets is valuable if value creating investment opportunities are available and cash flows are low 
due to the bad economic state. 
 
As stated, this paper aims to identify the informational aspect of cash reserve, namely its adverse 
selection effect. One may state that Myers and Majluf (1984), in their pioneering work on capital 
structure, were the first ones to allude to the adverse selection of cash reserve. In their work, the 
authors construct a model where information is one-sided based on the Pecking Order theory and 
that stock issuance has negative price implications. However, the fact that stock bidders are cash-
rich contradicts this fundamental theory of corporate financing and the need for a model with 
two-sided information asymmetry framework. 
 
Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) introduced a model that allowed uncertainties about both 
a bidder’s stand-alone value and deal synergies, which enabled violation of the Pecking Order 
theory. Target managers may misinterpret part of the bidder overvaluation as synergies and are 
appealed to accept stock as consideration. Therefore, assuming that excess cash reserves prevent 
fully stock financed acquisitions to be completed due to target unwillingness to accept stock 
considerations based on the adverse selection framework is not correct. Target unwillingness 
ascends from the difficulty to distinct between positive synergies and overvaluation, as they are 
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unclear for limited information target decision- makers. The market-wide component of 
overvaluation implies market values of both the bidder and target above intrinsic values. The 
target correctly adjusts the bids for potential market overvaluation, but being Bayesian
2
 updater, 
he puts some weight on high synergies as well. When the market-wide overvaluation is high, the 
estimation error associated with the synergy is high too, so the offer is more likely to be accepted 
(Gao, 2011). Cash consideration removes ‘lemon’ bidders trying to exploit stock overvaluation, 
which would provide target managers the security to accept a bid. The use of stock as 
consideration, given high cash levels manifests the adverse selection and investors would be 
inclined to depress the bidders share price. Thus, when the market is overvalued, then the target is 
more likely to overestimate the synergies even though he can see that his price is affected by the 
same overvaluation because he still underestimates the shared component of the misevaluation. In 
addition, Hansen (1987) proposes a model where the bidder’s uncertainty about the target’s value 
increases the probability of using stock as consideration due to the ‘contingency pricing effect’. 
Stock financing forces target shareholders to share the risk that the acquirer may have been 
overvalued.  
 
In a survey conducted by Lins et al. (2010), 200 corporate CFO’s were asked to determine the 
importance of 22 factors affecting excess cash reserve decisions. Based on the study, the most 
important factor is the security buffer that cash reserves provide against cash flow short falls. 47 
percent of the 188 respondents gave a 4 or a 5 on a scale of 0 to 5, where 5 is defined as highly 
important. The authors also find that future investment opportunities are also seen as an 
important factor, however it was ranked fifth in importance with a mean of 2.36. The respondents 
gave minimal importance to cash reserves to ensure efficiency in running operations, interest 
rates difference between cash and debt, and time taken to raise external funds a higher 
importance than future investment opportunities. Regulatory requirements and cash holdings of 
peers were seen with importance in the last quartile. I have included the full results of Lins et al. 
(2010) in Appendix D. 
 
                                                 
2
 Bayesian updating is the revision of prior probability estimate to produce a posterior probability estimate. In 
algebra it gets the form of conditional probability and can be written as: Prob(A|B) x Prob(B) = Prob (A and B) = 
Prob(B|A) x Prob(A).  
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2.2.2 Other informational implications of cash 
  
Maintaining high cash reserves has two strategic roles that have also informational relevance 1) 
precautionary motive; 2) managerial discretion motive. According to the precautionary motive, 
the potential underinvestment problems are addressed by holding excess cash reserves. 
Underinvestment problems are induced by costs associated with external financing decisions, 
which are subject to the adverse selection of equity (Myers and Majluf, 1984) and agency costs of 
debt (Myers, 1977; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Opler et al. (1999) provide a relation between 
underinvestment costs and growth opportunities – higher growth opportunities incur higher costs 
of external financing for shareholders (an empirical result later documented by Almeida et al., 
2004; and Bates et al., 2009). In European context, Faccio and Masulis (2005) bidders of higher 
growth opportunities are more inclined to use stock as consideration in takeovers.  
 
Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow theory assumes that more internal funds allow managers to elude 
control of the capital market. Following, the need for shareholder approval is decreased and 
managers obtain freedom to decide on investments according to their own discretion. Managers 
are reluctant to pay out funds, and they have an incentive to invest even when there are no 
positive net present value projects available. With increasing managerial discretion to misuse 
funds for value-destroying projects when cash reserves are high, the market for corporate control 
(a corporate governance mechanism) is supposed to limit self-serving behavior. However, higher 
degree of information asymmetry increases the vagueness of value-creating and value-destroying 
projects for outside stakeholders. Specifically, this makes determining excess cash reserve levels 
difficult for shareholders. Managerial discretion motive arises from entrenched managers being 
reluctant to use cash, an insulator against external capital market monitoring, as payment 
medium. Cash reserves are held even though profitable growth opportunities are exhausted and 
fiduciary duty would require them to pay-out cash in the form of dividends (Jensen, 1986; Opler 
et al., 1999). According to this view stock financed bids are cash preserving strategic decisions, 
given managerial entrenchment. The implication would be a negative price reaction as cash levels 
are maintained in order to lower monitoring power over actions. Operational performance of 
stock financed bids for cash-rich firms are also observed in this paper (Section 5.3.1). 
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Cash offers and stock offers have different tax implications. Due to tax obligations generated by 
cash offers for the target’s stockholders, the target firm might be inclined to prefer stock offers. 
The tax-free aspect of exchange offers enables the target to defer realized capital gains until the 
stock is sold. In certain countries, the depreciation basis of acquired assets remain the same in 
stock offers, whereas cash deals enables the acquiring firms to raise the depreciation basis of 
acquired assets to their market value. Nevertheless, due to the differential in tax treatment, higher 
acquisition prices are generally required in cash offers to offset the tax burden of the selling 
stockholders (Wansley, Lane and Yang, 1983). When comparing differences between countries, 
taxation issues are to be addressed as they most likely affect management decision making and 
therefore I elaborate on them in Section 3.2. 
 
2.3 M&A financing decision 
 
2.3.1 Determinants of payment method 
 
A firm’s method of payment decision could be driven by capital structure considerations if firms 
maintain a capital structure target. Tax benefits and benefits from reduced agency costs of debt 
financing against the expected costs of financial distress have been used to explain capital 
structure targets (Miller and Modigliani, 1963; Harris and Raviv, 1991; Myers, 1977; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Alternatively, Stulz (1988) and Harris and Raviv (1988) propose that capital 
structure could be driven by management preference to pay with debt financed cash in order to 
maintain control. Linn and Switzer (2001) argue that bidders use cash to deter competing bids 
when they have favorable private information indicating a high value for the target, potentially 
due to synergies. The authors also argue that a large cash offer increases the probability of the 
target accepting the offer and eliminates any delay, which could be exploited by other competing 
bids from other firms. Importantly, bidder firm management with favorable private information 
on future returns increases the fraction of cash as a method of payment. Rationale for this would 
be to deter competition and capture a large share of the synergistic gains. 
 
Following I have listed the most recognized determinants of methods of payment. 
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Collateral: Debt holders in firms with fewer tangible assets and more growth opportunities are 
subject to greater moral hazard risk, which increases the cost of debt, often making stock more 
attractive (Myers, 1977). Hovakiminian et al. (2001) find that there exists a positive correlation 
between tangible assets and leverage levels, implying a significant role of tangible assets on a 
firm’s debt capacity and the level at which it is utilized. Hence, collateral increases the use of 
cash as debt capacity is increased, which consequently lowers the probability of using equity. 
 
Leverage: M&A cash considerations are usually obtained by debt financing and therefore highly 
leveraged firms prefer to use stock as a method of payment. The capital structure choice boils 
down to the risks associated with financial leverage as discussed in Section 2.1. DeAngelo and 
Masulis (1980) predict the costs of excess debt levels in their paper and find that the marginal 
cost of excess debt increases along leverage. Harford et al. (2009) find that the fraction of a deal 
that is paid for with cash versus equity is negatively associated with the acquirer’s pre-acquisition 
leverage deviation. In other words, a firm behaves in a way that it balances its method of payment 
between cash and equity according to its leverage target. This conveys that the probability of 
using equity increases according to firm leverage. This is consistent with the well acknowledged 
fundamentals of corporate finance set out by Modigliani and Miller (1958).  
 
Bidder size: Bidder size is likely to be an explanatory variable when considering financing 
decisions. Larger firms are more diversified, which lowers expected bankruptcy costs. They also 
have better access to debt markets and lower flotation costs. Based on these attributes it may be 
argued that larger firms more readily use cash as M&A financing. In addition, the relative deal 
size (deal size diffused by bidder total assets) is more probably smaller for larger firms, which 
makes the bidder more apt to use cash reserves or unused debt capacity to finance the transaction. 
Further, the use of cash allows the bidder to avoid the significant costs of obtaining shareholder 
approval of preemptive rights exemptions and stock authorizations and the higher regulatory 
costs of stock offer (Faccio and Masulis, 2005). 
 
Market-to-book: Bidders with good growth opportunities convey a positive equity story for the 
target shareholders. Market-to-book, defined as the market value of equity over the book value of 
equity, is a commonly used proxy for growth opportunities. 
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Economic activity: Business cycle conditions are likely to have an influence on the choice of the 
decision between equity and cash consideration. Choe, Masulis and Nanda (1993) argue that the 
overall state of the M&A market is likely to increase the probability of using stock financing due 
to the fact that firms face lower adverse selection costs, more promising investment opportunities 
and less uncertainty about assets-in-place. This coincides with the findings of Rhodes-Kropf et al. 
(2005) where they show that equity financed acquisitions are observed with greater likelihood in 
merger waves.  
 
Operating cash flow: According to the Pecking Order hypothesis (Myers, 1984) managers follow 
a financing hierarchy as follows: internal finance, debt financing and lastly external equity 
financing. In addition, Jensen (1986) argues that there exists a positive correlation between 
amounts of free cash flow and cash financed acquisitions. Thus, higher free cash flows are 
expected to lower the probability of using equity as consideration. 
 
Sales growth: Historical sales growth may be used as a proxy for growth opportunities (Ismail 
and Krause, 2010). Even though the metric is backward looking, it removes the constraint of 
using analyst growth forecasts, which are not available for a large proportion of the sample firms. 
 
Corporate control: Amihud et al. (1990), Stulz (1988), and Jung, Kim and Stulz (1996) propose 
in their papers that major shareholders should be reluctant to use stock financing when there is 
dilution of control. Assuming control is valuable for shareholders
3
, there should be a clear 
propensity to use cash as consideration when the control position may be altered. A bidder with 
highly concentrated or highly diffused ownership structure is less likely to be concerned with 
corporate control issues. Martin (1996) and Ghosh and Ruland (1998) contemplate that there 
exists a negative relationship between the likelihood of stock financing and managerial 
ownership only over the intermediate ownership range. Concentrated ownership of a target means 
that a stock financed acquisition can create a large blockholder, threatening the corporate 
governance of the acquirer. This implies that if the target has a highly concentrated ownership 
structure and its relative size to the bidder is high, a stock financed acquisition will create a new 
                                                 
3
 Nenova (2003) and Dyck and Zingales (2004) document substantial benefits to corporate control in Europe. 
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bidder blockholder and the existing controlling shareholder will lose controlling power in the 
bidder. 
 
Relative deal value: Moeller et al. (2004) show that the relative size of the two firms will be 
relevant as the larger amount of cash required for a large target firm might be difficult to obtain. 
This will increase the probability of using equity, especially when the bidder’s debt capacity is 
limited. 
 
2.3.2 Effects of financing decision on post-acquisition performance 
 
Prior literature identifies three main types of synergies: 1) financial synergy; 2) operational 
synergy; 3) managerial synergy. In addition, other value creating sources have been suggested by 
researchers: market power (Ghosh, 2004), valuation differences between target and bidder (Jarrel 
et al., 1998), tax benefits, diversification and improvement of the marketability of securities 
(Mandelker, 1974). Shleifer and Vishny (1989) put forward that mergers are motivated by empire 
building, which is seen as an instrument to transfer wealth from the bidder to the target – not 
actual value creation. Similar effects are present in a hypothesis by Roll (1986) as he suggests 
that hubris
4
 motivates managers to acquire.  
 
Assuming managerial rationality, acquisition offers are extended on a value creation basis. 
Capturing identified synergies is a matter of consolidation and implementation efficacy post-
transaction and may deter value creation. Nevertheless, operating performance is assumed to 
improve as a result of the synergistic gains. However, previous studies document results to the 
opposite. Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1992) conduct a test of the post-merger performance of the 
50 highest value mergers of 1979 to 1984 in the US. They observe the operating performance of 
the two independent firms prior to the merger and compare it to the performance of the combined 
entity post the transaction. Healy et al. (1992) find no relation between changes in performance 
                                                 
4
 The Hubris Hypothesis is advanced as an explanation of corporate takeovers. It suggests that there is a tendency for 
bidder firms to pay too much. Firm managers are over optimistic about their ability to add value to a new firm. 
Hubris on the part of individual decision makers in bidding firms can explain why bids are made even when a 
valuation above the current market price is essentially a valuation error. Bidding firms that are said to be infected by 
hubris simply tend to pay too much for their targets. It is often argued by various experts that there really are no 
gains associated with corporate takeovers and even if there are, they are highly overestimated and the sources of 
these small gains are basically 'elusive'. 
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and the method of payment. It is possible, however, that this result was influenced by the small 
sample size (50 mergers, of which 13 were cash offers). They find that, on average, the operating 
performance of the combined entity improves and that this operating improvement is embedded 
in the announcement effect of the merger as positive stock reactions are observed on average. 
The authors find, however, that performance in general improves. The finding is consistent with 
Cornett and Tehranian (1992), who also reported improving performance for a sample of 30 bank 
mergers. Clark and Ofek (1994) investigate the relation between post-merger industry-adjusted 
performance and whether cash was included in a takeover offer. They find no significant relation. 
They also do not find any general improvement in performance as a consequence of the merger 
studied. 
 
Loughran and Vijh (1997) conclude that combinations resulting from cash offers earn excess cash 
that are significantly larger than those associated with stock offers. A reason why cash offers may 
be associated with greater post-merger excess returns is that the post-combination operating 
results for such offers may exhibit greater improvement that what is observed for combinations 
associated with stock offers (Linn, Switzer; 2001). Linn and Switzer (2001) report for a sample 
of 413 combinations that the change in performance of the merged firms is significantly smaller 
for cases in which the acquiring firm offered stock as compared to cash offers. 
 
Based on the study conducted by Gao (2011), post-acquisition investments are, in general, 
unrelated to pre-acquisition excess cash reserves. This finding is contrary to the view that excess 
cash reserve reflects growth. He finds, though, that long-term debt reduction is positively related 
to a bidder’s excess cash ratio, which is related to the overvaluation hypothesis discussed in the 
next subsection. 
 
2.4 Announcement effects of acquisitions 
 
When reviewing research on abnormal returns for bidders and targets, the literature is relatively 
scattered. There is a considerable contrast between the large share price returns of target firms 
and the frequently negligible returns of bidding firms. Empirical evidence suggests that target 
shareholders realize abnormal returns around the announcement day, which are significantly 
different from zero. For U.S. target firms, Servaes (1991), Kaplan and Weisbach (1992) and 
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Mulherin and Boone (2000) find abnormal returns over 20 percent around the offer 
announcement. Schwert (1996) finds that share price reactions are not confined to days around 
the announcement but actually commence already 42 days prior to the event, emphasizing the 
run-up effect. As with U.S. firms, European targets have been recognized to experience double-
digit abnormal returns. The returns have been decreasing as Franks and Harris (1989) found 
returns of 24 percent for the period 1955-1958 whereas Georgen and Renneboog (2004) discover 
only 13 percent for 1990-2001. Bidder share performance is insignificantly different from zero. 
Andrade et al. (2001), Franks et al. (1991) and Healy et al. (1992) show negative announcement 
effects whereas Asquith et al. (1983), Dennis and McConnell (1986) and Georgen and 
Renneboog (2004) show zero or slightly positive returns. The run-up effect is not either as strong 
for bidder firms as for targets. The returns of the combined are expected to increase as a result of 
the target firm’s established positive announcement effect and negligent bidder share price 
reaction. Researchers unanimously document significant positive announcement effects for the 
combined firm, although the size of the total effect varies across studies. Bradley et al. (1988), 
Lang et al. (1989) and Healy et al (1992) compute average abnormal returns of around 10 percent 
for the combined entity. Announcement gains of 4 percent are reported by Kaplan and Weisbach 
(1992), and Mulherin and Boone (2000).  
 
Research papers on how payment method affects the target and bidder share price performance 
around and after an M&A case varies also significantly. First, Moeller et al. (2004) and Andrade 
et al. (2001) argue that all-cash bids generate higher target and bidder returns compared to all-
equity acquisitions. An opposing view is presented by Franks et al. (1991), Chang (1998), 
Chatterjee and Kuenzi (2001) and Fuller et al. (2002) who report superior performance for stock 
acquisitions compared to cash acquisitions. The inspected share price performance varies 
significantly across the researches mainly due to differences in methodology as abnormal returns 
are measured with market modeling and varying bench-marking methods that are sensitive to the 
assumptions made on the peer groups formed in the studies. Franks et al. (1991), Lang et al. 
(1991), and Schlingemann (2004) and Harford (1999) attribute the negative effect of cash 
acquisitions to the agency cost of free cash flow. The underlying argument in most cases is the 
tendency of a cash rich firm to spend its resources on value –destroying acquisitions. Uddin and 
Boateng (2009) find that selected transaction-specific, firm-specific, and geographic 
characteristics affect the abnormal returns of acquiring firms. Relating to the firm-specific impact 
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on shareholder returns, Moeller, Schlingemann, Stulz (2005) find that the losses in shareholder 
wealth are caused by acquisitions by large firms, whereas when considering only small firms the 
shareholders gain in the aggregate. 
 
Announcement effects of stock financed acquisitions have been well researched in previous 
papers: e.g. Travlos (1987) and Wansley et al. (1987) all find negative announcement effects for 
stock offers. These results all coincide with the framework of Myers and Majluf (1984), where 
stock issuance indicates overvaluation as costs of adverse selection increase when moving from 
internal financing to equity financing. Market timing, similarly, is well researched, where major 
findings underline the negative announcement effects of stock issuance. Tapping capital markets 
at market highs is a strategic decision managers seriously consider, as documented by Graham 
and Harvey (2001). Stock financed acquisitions correlate with merger waves (Rhodes-Kropf et 
al., 2005; Dong et al., 2006), which emphasizes the market timing aspect of equity financing. 
Loughran and Vijh (1997) and Agrawal and Jaffe (2000) find that bidders underperform peers in 
the long-term, which implies a price adjustment post-transaction of stock bids. The assumption of 
one-sided asymmetry of information is relaxed by Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) when 
they introduce the possibility of information asymmetry in valuing synergies. Market irrationality 
is also considered by Shleifer and Vishny (2003) as they propose a model with irrational markets 
and self-serving target managers, in which it is common knowledge that the market is mispriced 
but self-correcting in the long-run. They propose a more behavioral model where announcement 
effects are not significantly different for stock and non-stock bidders, but in the long-term the 
fundamentals of the bidders expose possible overvaluations. Harford (2005) challenges the 
overvaluation hypothesis as the explanation for merger waves but concedes that equity valuation 
could impact acquisition decisions.  
 
Other characteristics of an acquisition have also been documented to affect announcement 
returns: 
 
 Diversification strategies are seen to destroy value as documented by Berger and Ofek (1995). 
This effect is related to the efficiency differences of diversifying portfolios between firms and 
investors. Diversifying takeovers are expected to benefit from financial synergies, which include 
cash flow stability, lower bankruptcy probability, cheaper access to capital, an internal capital 
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market, the use of underutilized tax shields, as well as contracting efficiencies created by a 
reduction in managers’ employment risk.  
 
Cross-border acquisitions tend to increase abnormal returns for target firms. It follows that the 
share price of bidders acquiring foreign firms significantly underperforms that of the bidders 
participating in domestic takeovers (Conn et al., 2005). The market anticipates that regulatory 
and national cultural differences between the bidders’ and targets’ countries may lead to 
difficulties in managing the post-merger process (Baldwin and Caves, 1991). Domestically-
oriented firms frequently resort to cross-border takeovers as a means to survive the tough 
international competition in global markets. Expansion abroad also enables firms to exploit 
differences in tax systems and to capture profits resulting from market inefficiencies such as 
national controls over labor markets (Servaes, 1994). In addition, imperfect capital markets allow 
firms to exploit favorable exchange rate movements by moving operations to other countries or 
by acquiring foreign firms. Moreover, Conn et al. (2005) suggest that the signaling effect of cash 
transactions may not have the same force in the case of cross-border mergers and acquisitions in 
that, other factors may have impact on the means of payment. It has been suggested that the use 
of equity by cross-border acquirers may be due to problems associated with acquiring 
information about the foreign firms. Further, the use of cash may be due to the reluctance of 
foreign target firms to accept overseas equity as suggested by Gaughan (2002) and this might 
neutralize the signaling impact of cash acquisitions. 
III. European context 
 
3.1 Distinct characteristics for the region 
 
Much of the change towards intra-European deals can be attributed to the challenges brought 
about by the development of the single European market and the introduction of the Euro in 
1999. Fragmented and mostly domestically-oriented European firms resorted to takeover deals as 
a means to survive the tougher regional competition created by the new market. The introduction 
of the Euro has put additional pressure on firms, as it eliminated all currency risks within the 
Eurozone and reduced the home bias of investors. Cross-border acquisitions are expected to yield 
cost advantages and are to enable firms to expand their business more rapidly abroad. Moreover, 
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takeover activity was fuelled by the creation of a liquid European capital market with new 
sources of financing (e.g. Euro-denominated bonds). As a result of such economic and structural 
changes on the Continent, the M&A market in Europe peaked at US$1.2 trillion in 1999, a 
marked contrast with the peak of the fourth merger wave which amounted to merely US$0.15 
trillion (Martynova and Renneboog, 2006). Reflecting on the boom in the stock markets at the 
end of the 1990’s, the attractiveness of equity as a means of payment was increased, which was 
mainly due to the overvaluation of equity providing bidders a cheap currency to pay for their 
acquisitions. The European market for corporate bonds experienced considerable growth and 
provided another accessible source of funds. In addition, a European junk-bond market emerged. 
Low interest rates and a bank attitude more receptive to risky loans also facilitated M&A activity. 
 
Managers and policy makers in EU believe that the creation of an integrated economic space 
within Europe depends on changing and homogenizing EU legislation (European Commission, 
2005, 2007). The process has, however, proven to be extremely slow, as from the first draft of the 
Takeover Directive
5
 proposed by the European Commission in 1985; it took 18 years to approve 
it. The directive, which included key provisions, to harmonize takeover mechanisms, regulatory 
frameworks and shareholder rights, remained subject to nationalistic biases.  
 
Faccio and Masulis (2005) find that U.K. and Irish bidders exhibit different motives for method 
of payment from those of Continental Europeans. United Kingdom and Ireland are the only 
Common Law countries in the sample, which means that they find that there exists importance of 
the bidder’s legal system when it is Common Law. I have included the major taxation differences 
in respect of M&A for the 5 largest countries in the EU-15 (76 percent of my M&A cases) in 
Table 1. La Porta et al. (1998) state that investor protection differs across countries because they 
belong to different legal families. Countries within continental Europe are civil law countries that 
enforce block-holder corporate governance systems in which investor protection is low
6
. They 
provide evidence that the nature and effectiveness of financial systems can be traced in part to the 
differences in investor protections against expropriation by majority shareholders, as reflected by 
                                                 
5
 A directive is a legislative act of the European Union which requires member states to achieve a particular result 
without dictating the means of achieving that result. Directives normally leave member states with a certain amount 
of leeway as to the exact rule to be adopted (Moschieri, 2009). 
6
 German (Germany) and Scandinavian (Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden) civil-countries have better 
enforcement of takeover regulation than French civil-countries (France, Belgium, The Netherlands) (Vijgen, 2007) 
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legal rules and the quality of their enforcement. La Porta et al. (1997) concludes that countries 
with better investor protection have higher abnormal returns since regulation protects them better 
and consequently they have more trust in the security market and are more willingly to exchange 
their funds for stocks.  
 
One of the well-known facts about corporate ownership is that the ownership of large listed firms 
is dispersed in the UK and concentrated in Continental Europe. In more than 50 percent of 
European firms a single voting block of shareholders commands a majority of shares (Franks, 
2009). In contrast, in the UK, it is less than three percent. It has been argued that concentrated 
ownership is a response to inadequate investor protection – in the absence of protection, investors 
sought to protect their investments through large share blocks. The difference in ownership 
concentrations can be attributed to weak investor protection in Continental Europe and strong 
investor protection in the UK. Faccio and Lang (2002) report that Western European firms are 
most likely to be widely held (36.93 percent) or family controlled (44.29 percent). Ownership 
dispersion is especially important in the UK and Ireland, while family control is more important 
in Continental Europe. They also find that the State is an important shareholder in some 
Continental European countries.  
 
3.2 Taxation differences 
 
An obstacle to European consolidation through unsolicited takeover offers is the lack of 
regulatory harmonization. While for the past 15 years, the EU Commission has been trying to 
create a regulatory infrastructure that would be conductive to consolidation, it has achieved 
mixed results at best. Certain milestones have been reached: the single currency, the EU 
prospectus directive
7
, and one accounting standard for all listed firms – IFRS8. However, in other 
areas, largely as a result of member states’ lack of political willingness to put national champions 
up for sales, the EU Commission has not achieved its objectives to establish a uniform takeover 
code or uniform set of corporate governance standards. Therefore golden shares and other forms 
of veiled or blatant national protectionism continue to exist. 
                                                 
7
 The EU Prospectus Directive is intended to create common disclosure standards for public issues of securities 
throughout the EU and to facilitate mutual recognition of prospectuses and listing particulars. 
8
 International Financial Reporting Standards 
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Table 1: M&A tax differences in major EU-15 countries 
  
Panel A: Tax position for target shareholders on cash offer
UK Germany France Italy Spain
Gains are taxable. 
However, there exists a 
relief called for corporate 
shareholders with a holding 
of at least 10% of shares 
for at least 12 months. 
The exemption ensures 
that firms should be able to 
restructure without 
taxation of capital gains.
In general, corporate 
shareholders pay tax on 
5% of the gain (effectively 
95% of the gain is 
exempt).
Corporate shareholders can 
benefit  from a 
participation exemption 
on 95% of the capital 
gains realized, provided the 
disposal is of "investment 
shares" held for at least 
two years. The remaining 
5% of the gain is taxed at 
the standard rate.
Corporate shareholders can 
benefit  from a 
participation exemption in 
respect of 95% of the gain, 
provided that 1) shares 
have been held for at least 
12 months prior to the 
sale; 2) the shares were 
recorded as a long term 
investment at the end of 
the first  accounting period 
after acquisition; and 3) a 
non-resident target must be 
resident in a jurisdiction 
which has an exchange of 
information agreement 
with Italy. 
If a 5% or higher stake in a 
Spanish company is held 
by a corporate shareholder 
for a minimum 12 month 
period, relief in the form 
of 100% tax credit is 
available in respect of the 
portion of the income 
corresponding to non-
distributed profits/ reserves 
generated throughout the 
holding period of the 
transferring shareholder 
and proportionally to the 
stake transferred.
Panel B: Tax position for target shareholders on a share for share offer
UK Germany France Italy Spain
Subject to certain 
conditions shareholders are 
not treated as making a 
disposal of their shares in 
the target. If rollover 
treatment is allowed, paper 
issued by the buyer is 
treated as the same asset as 
the shares sold. Tax is 
therefore payable only on 
a future disposal of the 
buyer’s paper 
consideration.
The tax position of the 
target shareholders who 
receive consideration in 
the form of shares does 
not differ from the 
treatment on a cash offer. 
However, rollover 
treatment applies for all 
shareholders otherwise 
subject to German tax if: 
the buyer is an EU based 
company which will hold 
the majority of voting 
rights in the Target.
The tax position of the 
target shareholders who 
receive consideration in 
the form of shares does 
not differ from the 
treatment on a cash offer. 
However, where rollover 
applies (e.g. cash 
component does not 
exceed 10% of 
consideration) any tax 
charge on disposal is 
deferred until the 
consideration shares are 
sold.
Tax treatment is similar to 
that of cash consideration. 
Where rollover applies, 
any tax charge on disposal 
is deferred until the 
consideration shares are 
sold. This situation may 
arise if fully equity 
financed acquisition and 
target’s shares are held on 
the balance sheet and face 
value.
The tax position of Target 
shareholders does not 
differ from the treatment 
on a cash offer. Rollover 
may apply subject to 
certain conditions, 
including: 1) Buyer acquires 
at least 50% of voting 
rights; 2) Buyer is resident 
for tax purposes in Spain 
and; 3) Any cash 
compensation is capped at 
10% of nominal value of 
the shares.
Panel C: Debt financing the takeover offer
UK Germany France Italy Spain
Finance costs associated 
with UK corporate debt are 
generally deductible. This 
is subject to anti-avoidance 
rules, including transfer 
pricing rules which restrict 
deductibility for debt with 
equity-like features and 
where the debt has tax 
avoidance as a main 
purpose
Generally, the deduction of 
interest expenses 
exceeding interest income 
is limited to 30% of the 
taxable EBITDA for 
income and trade tax 
purposes. Nondeductible 
interest may be carried 
forward. This interest 
barrier applies irrespective 
of the legal form of the 
financed business and does 
not distinguish between 
debt financing by 
shareholders or third 
parties. 
As a general rule, interest 
expenses are deductible for 
corporation tax purposes. 
This is subject to certain 
restrictions: 1) the interest 
must not exceed a 
statutory rate determined 
by averaging market rated 
loans 2) the leverage is 
subject to a 1:1.5 gearing 
ratio, interest cover ratio 
tests and similar rules.
Generally, the deduction of 
interest expenses 
exceeding interest income 
is limited to 30% of 
EBITDA. Any interest not 
so deductible can be carried 
forward and will be 
deductible in future years, 
subject to the same 30% 
test. 
Finance costs duly recorded 
in the profit  and loss 
account associated with the 
acquisition are generally 
deductible, subject to 
certain restrictions, 
including transfer pricing 
or thin capitalization rules 
in respect of loans received 
from related parties. 
Source: Smith, H., and Lutz, G., 2001. Tax in European M&A.
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Inspecting Table 1, the major differences in M&A taxation in Germany, UK, France, Italy, and 
Spain are outlined. First, a noticeable difference is the differences between the Common Law 
country UK and the others in tax position for target shareholders in cash offers. As the gains are 
taxable in the UK, but largely exempt in the other countries, target firms in the UK may be more 
reluctant to accept cash offers in the UK. Now acknowledging that the tax at which gains are 
taxed differs between the five countries, the effective difference might not be as severe. Second, 
the tax position for target shareholders on a share for share offer does not vary significantly 
between the countries if rollover is allowed. The differences are therefore more related to national 
taxation levels than M&A bound taxation directives. Third, the use of debt to finance acquisitions 
is made more appealing in the UK than in the other countries. UK does not limit the deductibility 
of interest costs, whereas at least in Germany and Italy net interest expense is capped at 30 
percent of EBITDA. In cases where relative deal value is high, a cash offer financed with debt 
will consequently be more appealing in the UK. The three main clauses in M&A directives across 
the five countries hence provide two outcomes: 1) cash offers are less appealing in the UK for the 
target; 2) taxation of equity financed acquisitions does not provide major differences across the 
countries. 
   
3.3 Cross-border acquisitions in Europe 
 
Cross-border acquisitions are mostly undertaken in order to cope with the strong international 
competition in international markets. Furthermore, firms expand abroad to take advantage of 
imperfections in the international capital market. Firms can, for example, benefit from different 
tax systems (discussed above) or exploit favorable exchange rate movements by moving 
operations to other countries or by acquiring foreign firms. As a result, the market expects that 
cross-border deals have a higher chance of succeeding and consequently value those deals more 
than domestic ones. Cross-border deals within the EU have some advantages with respect to 
cross-border deals outside the region. Bidders within Europe rely on single currency, which 
diminishes the risks of foreign currency volatility. This reduces entry barriers, easing the 
exploitation of economies of scale and the transfer of intellectual capital and technology, and 
fosters the growth of cross-border deals (Campa and Hernando; 2008). 
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Moschieri (2009) shows that the UK experiences a higher proportion of cross-border deals than 
the European average. In addition to the higher investor protection, British firms have a more 
decentralized decision-making process, better accounting standards, stronger shareholder 
protection and operate in a more active and competitive market than the rest EU-15 countries. 
Overall, these characteristics of the UK explain why British firms are more active in M&As and 
why they are more attractive to foreign bidders. In a study strictly focused on UK firms, Uddin 
and Boateng (2009) find that UK firms engaged in cross-border M&As earn positive abnormal 
returns. Martynova and Renneboog (2009) find that domestic mergers and acquisitions trigger 
higher abnormal returns than cross-border operations. When a UK target is involved, the 
abnormal returns are higher than those of bids involving a Continental European target. 
IV. Hypotheses 
 
The study tests three separate aspects of excess cash reserves. I first examine the response of 
investors to announced stock-financed acquisitions. This will shed light on the propensity of 
investors to revalue bidders’ position as a financial asset. Second, the probability of a cash-rich 
firm to use equity as consideration is tested. Third, the operating performance and post-
acquisition uses of funds are investigated. Based on these three approaches I have formed 
underlying hypotheses for the empirical section. 
 
Hypothesis 1.1: Excess cash reserves diminish post-acquisition bidder returns in fully 
stock financed acquisitions  
 
In the world of asymmetric information, the method of payment may signal valuable information 
to the market. If the bidding firm’s managers possess information about the intrinsic value of 
their firm, independent of the acquisition, which is not fully reflected in the pre-acquisition stock 
price, they will finance the acquisition in the most profitable way for the existing shareholders. 
Mergers involving equity financing are inherently different from cash acquisition as there exists 
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valuation uncertainties. Target firms face the binary decision making problem to accept or reject, 
which is subject to uncertainty of the appropriate value of the offered shares
9
.  
 
A number of explanations have been offered to explain the negative stock price reaction of 
acquisition announcements. Roll (1986) argues that managers of bidding firms suffer from 
hubris. Both Myers and Majluf (1984) and Hansen (1987) predict bidder choice of payment is 
skewed towards securities when the valuation levels are high and preference for cash when 
undervaluation occurs. As uncertainty about the bidder asset value rises, this adverse selection 
effect is exacerbated. Korajczyk, Lucas and McDonald (1991) argue that new stock investors 
bear greater adverse selection risk after stock issues. Travlos (1987) finds that stock-financed 
M&A deals exhibit much larger negative announcement effects than cash-financed deals. The 
announcement is hypothesized to be related to the finding that firms with poor stock returns 
generally pay with equity. He concludes that this is consistent with the empirical validity of an 
adverse selection effect. A related hypothesis, formalized by McCardle and Viswanathan (1994) 
and Jovanovic and Braguinsky (2002), is that firms make acquisitions when they have exhausted 
their internal growth opportunities. Accordingly, the market participants interpret a cash offer as 
good news and a common stock exchange offer as bad news about the firm’s true value. If such 
information effects are important, the bidding firm’s stock price change at the announcement date 
will reflect both the gain from the takeover (weighted by the probability that the takeover bid will 
go through) and the information effects.  
 
Further, reflecting on the fact that two firms lack perfect positive correlation between cash flows, 
the default risk of the combined entity may be decreased through a merger. This co-insurance 
effect leads to an increase in the combined entity (Lewellen, 1971). Also latent debt capacity in 
the target will increase debt capacity in the combined entity (Travlos, 1987). In both cases, higher 
debt capacity increases the value for debt holders at the expense of shareholders (Higgins and 
Schall, 1975; and Galai and Masulis, 1976). Thus, stock financed acquisitions transfer, under the 
mentioned circumstances, value from shareholders to debt holders, which is reflected on the share 
price of the bidding firm. 
                                                 
9
 Kaplan (1993) discusses the Paramount-Viacom merger where valuation issues were important as the supreme 
court of Delaware claimed that Paramount’s Board of Directors breached its fiduciary duties to shareholders by 
accepting the Viacom without ever looking into another competing offer. 
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Hypothesis 1.2: The negative effect of excess cash reserves on bidder CARs is lessened 
with lower levels of information asymmetry  
 
Researching the relation between cash holdings and asymmetries of information and firm values I 
find two interpretations that could be applied. Based on Myers and Majluf (1984) cash holdings 
in combination with a higher level of information asymmetry have a positive influence on firm 
value because the adverse selection costs that arise from external finance can be avoided. A 
contrary view, Jensen (1986) proposes his free cash flow theory, which coupled with a higher 
level of information asymmetry leads to extreme moral hazard. From the two opposing views the 
interpretations in the context of excess cash holdings are: 1) higher levels of asymmetric 
information increase the negative relation of bidder CARs and excess cash reserve; 2) higher 
levels of asymmetric information decrease the negative relation of bidder CARs and excess cash 
reserve. Given the findings of Gao (2011) and Drobetz et al. (2010), they provide evidence that 
firm values are less affected by excess cash in situations where there is a higher level of 
transparency of the bidder. I therefore base my hypothesis according to the empirical finding. 
 
Hypothesis 1.3: The negative effect of excess cash reserves on bidder CARs is emphasized 
in Common Law countries 
 
According to the findings of Uddin and Boateng (2009) UK firms experience positive short-term 
abnormal returns form cross-border acquisitions. When this finding is translated into reasoning 
for why cross-border acquisitions have provided positive abnormal returns, while the bidder 
returns have been reported to be ambiguous, I believe that the differences in bidder and target 
legislation have influence. In other words I find that Common Law portrays equity financed 
acquisitions in better light than Code Law countries and therefore the short-term share price 
reaction is better. Complementing this finding, Martynova and Renneboog (2009) find that target 
firms of French, German and EU-accession legal origins earn the lowest abnormal return upon 
the bid announcement, whereas UK and Scandinavian targets earn most. While the abnormal 
returns have been shown to be higher in Common Law countries, I anticipate that the adverse 
selection of cash reserves is highlighted in these countries, which will translate into a more 
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negative effect on bidder CARs. The hypothesis resides mainly in the fact that market efficiency 
is higher in Common Law countries (La Porta et al, 1999). 
 
Hypothesis 2.1: Excess cash reserves decrease the probability of using stock as a method 
of payment in acquisitions 
 
Excess cash is expected to be deployed in events, where the expected return of the investment is 
higher than the return on the asset deployed. As the interest received on cash is close to negligent 
I expect M&A cases to provide an opportunity where the cash reserves can be utilized. According 
to the Pecking Order theory, firms will choose to minimize the costs associated with financing 
and therefore cash is assumed to be preferred against debt or equity. If the minimum level of cash 
needed for daily operations is exceeded there should be an increased propensity to use the excess 
cash in M&A financing. Therefore in the presence of excess cash reserves I expect the method of 
payment to be skewed towards cash resulting in a negative relation between excess cash reserves 
and probability of using equity.  
 
Surprisingly, it has been shown that high cash firms do not use their cash stockpiles to finance 
acquisitions. Pinkowitz, Sturgess, Williamson (2011) show that while cash-rich firms are not 
more likely to be overvalued, they are more likely to use equity as the method of payment when 
they are overvalued. The result that cash rich firms take advantage of market timing is consistent 
with the findings of Baker and Wurgler (2002) and Graham and Harvey (2001). Cash richness is 
therefore considered as proxy for capitalizing on overvaluation, which consequently is consistent 
with seeking funding from the cheapest source available. In addition, the hypothesis that growth 
opportunities drive firms to maintain higher cash reserves, the greater potential will also be 
embedded in the valuation levels of such firms. It is therefore important to identify the ‘multiple 
enhancement factor that will most likely have effect on management decisions. As an example, 
the recent IPO of LinkedIn, an on-line social media platform, was valued highly based on growth 
expectations which lead to unprecedented valuation multiples (sales multiple: 14.0x). Inflated 
valuation multiples increase the probability of using stock as consideration, where the market 
value of equity is driven more by growth prospects than overvaluation. 
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Hypothesis 2.2: Cash rich firms are less likely to finance cross-border acquisitions with 
equity than non-cash rich firms 
 
I expect cash-rich firms to be inclined to use cash as part of the consideration for a deal. In cross-
border acquisitions this inclination is expected to be even stronger because of the differences in 
investor pools between the bidder-home country and target home-country. In cross-border deals, 
selling stock to foreign investors can entail several problems. I am concerned with the possibility 
that investors have a home country bias in their portfolio decisions as documented in Coval and 
Moskowitz (1999), French and Poterba (1991), and Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001), among 
others. This can reflect a foreign stock’s greater trading costs, lower liquidity, exposure to 
exchange risk, and less timely, more limited access to firm information. Based on this finding, 
the shareholders of the target firm are assumed to be reluctant to accept shares of a firm 
domiciled in another country.  
 
Hypothesis 2.3: Probability of using equity in M&A cases is increased for both cash rich 
and non-cash rich firms in Common Law countries 
 
Code Law countries have generally a more concentrated shareholder base, which has been 
identified to be result of weaker investor protection (La Porta, 1997). Weaker investor protection 
is seen to decrease shareholder willingness to transfer funds for equity and therefore Code Law 
countries are assumed to experience weaker abnormal returns for bidders in fully equity financed 
transactions. In addition, the fact that the State has a stake in large firms in some Continental 
European countries increases the threshold for these firms to use equity as a method of payment.  
 
Hypothesis 3.1: Post-acquisition bidder operating performance is better for cash rich 
firms 
 
Assuming Hypothesis 1.1 holds, the participation of a bidder with excess cash reserves in a fully 
stock financed transaction is likely to be motivated by both synergies and market timing. This 
derives from the fact that cash rich bidders experience negative price corrections that off-set the 
positive effect of market timing. Here, I assume that the bidder acknowledges the price correction 
and is hence motivated to perform the transaction based on higher synergies. Through higher 
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synergies the bidder will be able to enhance operating performance, which should be 
demonstrated as higher operating cash flows. Similarly, as discussed earlier, targets accepting 
stock offers have perceived higher synergy potential. Thus, I hypothesize that the operating 
performance of the cash rich bidder exceeds the operating performance of the non-cash rich 
bidder in the following three years of the transaction.  
 
Slightly contradicting my hypothesis, Ghosh et al. (2001) find that unlike for cash acquisitions, 
cash flows do not increase for merging firms that use stock as consideration. Moreover, it appears 
that cash flow margins, sales growth, and operating costs decrease following stock acquisitions. 
The empirical results for the study were weak, as stated in the original paper, and therefore I 
maintain my initial hypothesis of enhanced operating performance for stock financed 
acquisitions. 
 
Hypothesis 3.2: Cash reserve is decreasing for cash-rich firms post transaction 
 
As discussed earlier, one motive for firms to maintain excess cash is further growth opportunities. 
The convergence to ‘normal’ cash levels is only lagged over the inspected transaction as cash is 
invested later. I relate this hypothesis with the Static Trade-off theory where adverse events 
pushing leverage off its long-term level is only momentary. Cash reserves are diminished by 
increases in uses of funds in R&D, capital expenditure and other acquisitions. Therefore I assume 
that excess cash reserves diminish, or at least partially diminish, in the following three years of 
the transaction.  
 
Based on the assumption that firms seek to deploy their assets in a way that maximizes 
shareholder value, firms with excess cash are expected to use this reserve in financing growth, 
therefore making cash or mixed offers. Therefore higher levels of synergies are expected for cash 
rich firms, which translate into higher operating cash flows post-transaction. High cash holding 
could prevent managers from quickly scaling down unprofitable business lines as cash itself and 
the interest income earned on it serves as a buffer to operating losses. Opler et al. (1999) show 
that excess cash is used to cover operating losses. Mikkelson and Partch (2003) analyze this 
aspect by investigating the operating performance of firms with extraordinary high cash holdings. 
They find that there are no adverse effects of high liquid assets on corporate performance. Their 
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evidence even suggests that firms with high cash holdings perform better than a sample of 
matched firms. Also the impact of corporate cash holdings upon shareholder wealth depends on 
the costs that shareholders have to bear when trying to disgorge cash from the corporate level 
against the will of the management.  
V. Data and Methodology 
 
This section introduces the data and methods used to derive the results in Section VI. Any 
specifications made to tables or figures are mentioned separately.  
 
5.1 Data description 
 
This paper reports results based on three interconnected data sets, which are introduced in this 
section. The core sample of this study is the list of companies domiciled in one of the EU-15 
countries that have engaged in fully financed M&A activity in the period 1999-2010. However, 
in order to achieve more reliable results on defining excess capital, the key dependent variable in 
my study, I have gathered a set of all active and inactive firms domiciled in the EU-15 in the 
period 1996-2010
10
. 
 
The primary data is from the SDC M&A database, covering the years 1999-2010. I require 
acquisitions to be stock-financed in order to minimize agency complications of free cash flow
11
. 
The sample is geographically restricted to contain only listed companies in EU-15 countries
12
, 
where both the bidder and target are required to be domiciled in one of the countries. The reason 
for the geographical limits is the secondary aim of the study is to analyze any characteristics 
differentiating countries from other countries. The reason for containing only listed companies is 
the unification of equity financing opportunities, which are considered similar for all listed 
companies. 
 
                                                 
10
 The extended period in measuring excess cash reserve is due to independent variables in the regression analysis 
that require a certain time series prior to the transaction. These variables are introduced in the ‘Methods’ subsection.  
11
 Jensen (1986) noted that free cash flows allowed firms’ managers to finance projects earning low returns which 
therefore might not be funded by the equity or bond markets. 
12
 Countries include Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the UK. 
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Figure 1: Deal count and average deal value 
 
 
I also include several other restrictions to my data and carefully omit observations that do not 
meet the standards for selection. From the sample of 2,204 transactions I omit ones that do not 
report the deal value and where the stake purchased did not exceed 10 percent. This decreases the 
sample size to 1,423 observations. Then I require annual statement figures to be retrievable for 
the firms in the M&A sample. This diminishes the sample size further to 1,109. Finally I impose 
a requirement for the firms to have 2 years of consecutive daily share price data prior to the event 
in order to estimate abnormal returns
13
. This diminishes the working sample to a size of 988 
deals. In this paper I will refer to this core working sample as Sample (1). 
 
                                                 
13
 I also require there to be share price data 10 days post transaction, but this has no effect on the sample size. 
Panel A: Deal count and average deal value
Panel B: Equity vs. cash and mixed offer statistics
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Equity offers
Count (000's) 101 150 68 33 64 76 108 106 112 61 46 63
(%) 6.3 % 8.6 % 6.1 % 3.1 % 6.0 % 6.1 % 7.5 % 6.4 % 6.5 % 5.2 % 6.3 % 6.7 %
Avrg. deal value (EURbn) 3.34 1.55 0.81 0.56 0.42 1.80 0.42 1.31 0.48 0.38 0.15 0.58
O ther offers
Count (000's) 1496 1600 1041 1028 1008 1176 1328 1551 1608 1106 680 873
(%) 93.7 % 91.4 % 93.9 % 96.9 % 94.0 % 93.9 % 92.5 % 93.6 % 93.5 % 94.8 % 93.7 % 93.3 %
Avrg. deal value (EURbn) 0.56 0.37 0.36 0.34 0.34 0.40 0.49 0.60 0.73 0.61 0.52 0.37
Deal count and average deal value. Panel A depicts the number of deals announcement in each year during the period 1999-2010 in the EU15
countries. The observations included in the graph are based on the working sample of 988 deals to which sampling restrictions have been
imposed. The graph also shows the average deal value on annual basis. Average deal value is based on the sum of deal values diluted by the
number of deals each year(Ʃ [ xij] / nij, where x is the average of deal value in a given year i). Panel B shows the relation of equity financed
offers and other offers. The number of deals, % of total, and the average deal values are showed separately.
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Figure 1 presents the number of fully stock financed M&A transactions and the average deal 
value over the period 1999-2010. It includes a separation of hot and non-hot equity markets based 
on the absolute value of the deals announced in each year. The period 1999-2000, referred to as 
the ‘IT-bubble’ years, experienced large volumes of M&A transactions. The large percentage of 
deals in the TMT (telecom, media, and technology) sector underlines the vast interest in IT firms, 
where valuations were based essentially on growth prospects. The years following the change of 
the millennium, 2001-2003, were significantly slower in terms of absolute deal value. The change 
from 2000 to 2001 and 2002 were -76.4 percent and -92.0 percent respectively. The increase 
from 2003 onwards until 2007 was significant where annual deal values increased by 
approximately 100 percent from 2003. Credit crises escalating to a global financial crisis marked 
the downfall of M&A activity throughout the rest of the decade. External sources of finance 
dried-up and the entire global economy experienced a downfall. Consequently M&A deals dried-
up, where equity financed transactions were even more affected as valuation levels were low and 
demand for equity securities was negligent. A clear indicator of the M&A market was the number 
of deals decreasing by 45.5 percent and the yearly deal values by 57.4 percent. Even though the 
markets have rebounded from the lowest point, I still do not classify the year 2010 as a hot equity 
market for similar reasons as for 2004. 
 
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics of M&A transactions in the EU-15 countries during the 
period 1999-2010. The statistics are based on the 988 deals that are included in the working 
sample. As expected the UK provides a large percentage of observations, 50.9 percent. Due to the 
sampling methods, Finland occupies a relatively large percentage of the total sample (5.3 
percent), which is only 0.3 percent less than Germany with a significantly larger economy. 
Average deal values are highly affected by large deals on country level, especially for countries 
where M&A activity is low for a given year. For example, in Belgium, the acquisition of Almanij 
NV in 2004 (non-hot market) for a consideration of €20.8bn shifts the average significantly 
higher. When considering valuation levels, it is clear that hot equity markets provide higher 
multiples for earnings and book value of equity. Market-to-book averages for all countries for 
Hot and Non-hot markets are 1.7x and 0.9x respectively. Similarly, for price-to-earnings 
multiples are 18.8x and 13.8x respectively.  
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of equity financed offer bidders 
 
Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Ireland-Rep Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Spain Sweden UK
Overall
Number of M&A cases 8 24 22 52 75 55 15 14 64 7 23 12 56 58 503
(% of total) 0.81 % 2.43 % 2.23 % 5.26 % 7.59 % 5.57 % 1.52 % 1.42 % 6.48 % 0.71 % 2.33 % 1.21 % 5.67 % 5.87 % 50.91 %
Average deal value 308 1 808 249 660 3 422 1 712 614 25 2 078 571 739 968 1 099 335 836
Relative deal value 0.1x 0.1x 0.1x 0.2x 0.1x 0.2x 0.3x 3.2x 0.2x 0.3x 0.3x 0.0x 0.3x 0.1x 2.8x
Bidder market-to-book 0.9x 0.6x 0.8x 1.3x 0.7x 0.8x 0.4x 1.3x 0.4x 2.2x 1.0x 0.3x 0.6x 1.7x 4.4x
Bidder price-to-earnings 13.0x 15.9x 10.9x 24.2x 23.7x 19.8x 22.4x n.m. 28.2x 11.3x 12.2x 15.2x 37.9x 20.3x 8.1x
Hot equity market (1999-2000 and 2005-2007)
Number of M&A cases 2 16 12 35 41 35 7 8 31 6 12 7 35 35 295
(% of total) 0.20 % 1.62 % 1.21 % 3.54 % 4.15 % 3.54 % 0.71 % 0.81 % 3.14 % 0.61 % 1.21 % 0.71 % 3.54 % 3.54 % 29.86 %
Average deal value 78 1 663 387 634 4 770 1 763 978 11 2 785 665 668 1 281 1 574 321 1 128
Relative deal value 0.1x 0.1x 0.0x 0.2x 0.1x 0.3x 0.5x 0.0x 0.2x 0.4x 0.5x 0.0x 0.4x 0.1x 1.5x
Bidder market-to-book 1.0x 1.1x 1.3x 1.4x 0.9x 1.2x 0.5x 1.7x 0.6x 2.9x 1.3x 0.3x 0.8x 3.3x 7.0x
Bidder price-to-earnings 13.2x 41.5x 32.5x 30.9x 23.7x 24.7x 40.3x n.m. 14.9x 5.5x 13.5x 17.0x 98.7x 15.7x n.m.
Non-hot equity market (2001-2004 and 2008-2010)
Number of M&A cases 6 8 10 17 34 20 8 6 33 1 11 5 21 23 208
(% of total) 0.61 % 0.81 % 1.01 % 1.72 % 3.44 % 2.02 % 0.81 % 0.61 % 3.34 % 0.10 % 1.11 % 0.51 % 2.13 % 2.33 % 21.05 %
Average deal value 385 2 240 7 741 728 1 605 199 61 1 170 2 833 28 308 358 231
Relative deal value 0.1x 0.2x 0.1x 0.1x 0.1x 0.1x 0.1x 4.0x 0.2x 0.0x 0.1x 0.0x 0.0x 0.1x 4.8x
Bidder market-to-book 0.6x 0.5x 0.6x 1.0x 0.5x 0.7x 0.4x 1.0x 0.4x 1.6x 0.9x 0.3x 0.6x 1.3x 3.0x
Bidder price-to-earnings 13.0x 14.6x 6.0x 20.4x 18.0x 19.6x 20.0x n.m. 34.6x 11.3x 12.1x 9.7x 36.4x 26.1x 8.1x
Descriptive statistics. The table provides number of deals, average deal value, relative deal value, bidder market-to-book, and bidder price-to-earnings for each of the EU15 countries included in the M&A sample. The
statistics are provided for the 12 year period 1999-2010 as well as differentiating between Hot (1999-2000 and 2005-2007) and Non-hot (2001-2004 and 2008-2010) equity markets. Number of deals is the count of M&A
transaction purely financed by equity that have been included in the sample. Average deal value is the calculated as a equally weighted sum of deal value diluted by the number of deals (Ʃ [ xij] / nij, where x is the average of
deal value in a given year i and j is a dummy variable for Hot and Non-hot equity markets). Relative deal value is calculated as deal value diluted by the bidder enterprise value (market value of equity plus net book value of
debt). Market-to-book value is the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity. Price-to-earnings is the market value of equity divided by the annual net income.
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For determining firms excess cash reserve ratio, I require a sample of all active and inactive firms 
operating in the EU-15 countries. I also extend the time period to include the years 1995-2010 
due to independent variable requiring a time series of 4 years prior to the transaction. This sample 
totals 6,209 firms and 74,508 firm years. I include the same restrictions as for the Sample (1), 
which diminishes the sample size to 3,788 and 45,336 firm years. In this study I will refer to this 
sample as Sample (2). 
 
Finally, to test the two latter sections of this study I impose further restrictions for Sample (1). In 
order to inspect the probability of a stock consideration, I require five year consecutive time 
series for annual sales prior to the transaction, which diminishes the sample size from 988 to 567. 
This sample of purely equity financed M&A cases is inflated by cash and mixed offers for which 
the same criteria are imposed on. The sample consisting of all types of offers includes 4033 
firms. For testing operating performance and uses of funds post-transaction I need 3 years of 
annual statement figures after the transaction. Therefore I amend the initial sample of M&A deals 
1999-2010 to exclude the final three years, which decreases the number of observations from 988 
to 691. These samples will be referred to as Sample (3) and Sample (4) respectively. 
 
5.2 Methods 
 
In this subsection I present a synopsis of the different methods employed in my paper. In general 
I use multivariate regression in a large proportion of the reported results. Due to the straight-
forward nature of the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression model, I do not introduce the 
reader to this methodology. All other methods used in this paper are on the other hand mentioned 
and described to the extent that I find relevant. I elaborate more extensively on methods that I 
find to be more in-depth in nature or otherwise more complex. 
 
5.2.1 Logit regression 
 
Logistic regression is an approach to prediction, like the OLS regression. However, with logistic 
regression, the researcher is predicting a dichotomous outcome. That is, the dependent variable is 
set as a binary outcome of one or zero. This situation poses problems for the assumptions of OLS 
that the error variances (residuals) are normally distributed. Instead, they are more likely to 
33 
 
 
 
follow a logistic distribution. When using the logistic distribution, an algebraic conversion is 
made to arrive at the usual linear regression equation (which is typically written as Y = B0 + B1X 
+ e). I use the logistic regression to measure the relation between certain bidder firm 
characteristics and the probability of using equity as a payment method in M&A cases. I 
construct the regression models largely following Gao (2011) where the dependent variable is set 
as one if equity is used and zero otherwise. The main explanatory variable is the excess cash 
reserve ratio derived through OLS regression. I use a set of control variables to capture the effect 
of previously observed firm characteristics that affect equity financing decision. In these models I 
also use industry and year dummies to account for the time and industry differences. 
 
5.2.2  Heckman two-stage test  
 
In his work, Gao (2011) uses a variant of the truncated regression specification formalized by 
Eckbo et al. (1990). The method does not significantly vary from the Heckman process and 
therefore I use Heckman treatment effect model to take into account the self-selection bias. The 
method consists of two stages. First I estimate the sample-selection correlation term, denoted as 
Mills ratio, using linear two-step Heckman selection model and secondly add the Mills ratio to 
the main regression and estimate it using OLS. This method assumes the decision to have certain 
characteristics and engage in M&A activity is made simultaneously (i.e. the error terms of the 
two equations are correlated). The selection equation is estimated by maximum likelihood as an 
independent Probit model to determine the decision to join using information from the whole 
sample of members and nonmembers. A vector of inverse Mills ratios (estimated expected error) 
can be generated from the parameter estimates (Greene, 1993). The level of advance use, y, is 
observed only when the selection equation equals 1 (i.e. firms engaging in acquisition activity) 
and is then regressed on the predictor variables, x, and the vector of inverse Mills ratios from the 
selection equation by ordinary least squares. Therefore, the second stage reruns the regression 
with the estimated expected error included as an extra predictor variable, removing the part of the 
error term correlated with the predictor variable and avoiding the bias. Sample selection bias has 
been corrected by the selection equation, which determines whether an observation makes it into 
the nonrandom sample. 
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In case the selection dependent variable was linear I could directly use the linear two-step 
Heckman selection model estimation, but because the decision to acquire another firm is 
categorical, this is not possible as Stata omits the dependent variable due to collinearity. Thus, I 
need to estimate the Mills ratio first. More specifically, depending whether the firm engages in 
using equity or not Mills ratio is determined as follows: 
 
 ̂i  = 
   ̂    
   ̂    
     if M&A activityi = 1 
 ̂i  = 
    ̂    
     ̂    
    if M&A activity1 = 0 
 
where   denotes the density distribution function and   the density distribution function of the 
standard normal distribution. In the second stage, the Mills ratio,  ̂I is added to the main 
regression which is then estimated by using OLS. According to Edelen and Kadlec’s 
methodology (2004)  ̂ into the OLS regression is similar to adding a correlated omitted variable 
to a misspecified regression.  
 
The reason I include a sampling bias correction method in the robustness tests is the increased 
likelihood of certain firms to be included in my samples. This has been overlooked by many 
M&A concentrated studies even though it is widely acknowledged. I perform this test to the 
probability of using equity section, as I find that sampling bias is most probably a distorting 
factor in these tests.  
 
5.2.3  Wilcoxon rank sum 
 
The Wilcoxon signed rank sum test is another example of a non-parametric or distribution free 
test. The Wilcoxon signed rank sum test is used to test the null hypothesis that the median of a 
distribution is equal to some value. It can be used a) in place of a one-sample t-test b) in place of 
a paired t-test or c) for ordered categorical data where a numerical scale is inappropriate but 
where it is possible to rank the observations. The reason I use the rank sum test, is to test the 
statistical difference of bidder firm characteristics in hot and non-hot equity markets. Here, I do 
relax any assumptions on the structure of the underlying distributions, even though there is 
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reason to believe that the distributions of the two sub-samples are similarly shaped. The test was 
also performed by Gao (2011) and therefore I apply the similar approach for my samples. This 
test is used in a univariate analysis, where different firm characteristics of all-stock and other 
offers are investigated. In addition, I use the Wilcoxon rank sum test in a robustness test, where 
the results presented in Table 6 are sensitized to sampling bias and the corrected results are 
compared to the initially presented figures. 
 
5.2.4 Wald test 
 
Related to the logistic regression method described above, the Wald test is a way of testing the 
significance of specific independent variables in a statistical model. In logistic regression there 
exists a dichotomous outcome variable and one or more explanatory variables. For each 
explanatory variable in the model there will be an associated parameter. The Wald test, described 
by Polit (1996) and Agresti (1990), is one of a number of ways of testing whether the parameters 
associated with a group of explanatory variables are zero. 
 
If for a particular explanatory variable, or group of explanatory variables, the Wald test is 
significant, then we would conclude that the parameters associated with these variables are not 
zero, so that the variables should be included in the model. If the Wald test is not significant then 
these explanatory variables can be omitted from the model. When considering a single 
explanatory variable, Altman (1991) uses a t-test to check whether the parameter is significant. 
For a single parameter the Wald statistic is just the square of the t-statistic and so will give 
exactly equivalent results. An alternative and widely used approach to testing the significance of 
a number of explanatory variables is to use the likelihood ratio test. This is appropriate for a 
variety of types of statistical models. Agresti (1990) argues that the likelihood ratio test is better, 
particularly if the sample size is small or the parameters are large. However, for the purpose of 
this study, given the large number of observations and small parameters, I find that the Wald 
statistic is sufficient for testing the significance of the explanatory variables. I will be applying 
this method to test the coefficients for the probability of using equity in M&A cases in the 
robustness tests. 
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5.2.5 Winsorising 
 
Winsorising is a method where a variable is transformed so that x percent of observations at the 
tail(s) of a distribution are converted to reflect the x percent value. Practically this means that 
observations at the tail(s) of a distribution take values in the xth percentile and (100-x)th 
percentile respectively. Winsorising generally increases robustness of estimators to which the 
method has been applied to. The method can be applied to one or both tails of the distribution. In 
this study, I use winsorising to remove uncertainty on whether tail values are caused by 
randomness or their outlier nature. I winsorise the tails of both the dependent CAR variable and 
the independent excess cash reserve ratio at 5 percent level on both tails. All other continuous 
independent variables are winsorised at 1 percent level on both sides. 
 
5.2.6 CAR calculation 
 
The event study procedures are gathered from previous researches by Bowman (1983), Brown 
and Warner (1980 and 1985), and Kritzman (1994). The parameters for the market model are 
based on a 2 year window prior to the transaction, including 504 trading days for each of the 988 
firms. In order to achieve the possible estimates, I have matched the firm stock returns to main 
country indexes, i.e. for each firm the index returns of their domicile country is used to derive 
abnormal returns. The following is the formula for OLS market model to compute abnormal 
returns:  
 
    ARjt = Rjt (α+ βRmt) 
 
where: 
ARjt = abnormal return of stock j on day t 
Rjt = actual return on the jth stock on day t 
Rmt =  return on the market index, value-weighted return 
α, β = the market model parameter estimates for stock j for the control period 
(event day -5 years through -30 day). The coefficients estimated were used to 
compute the abnormal daily returns for the test period (event day -2 to +2) where 
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event day +t(-t) represents the nth trading day after (before) the announcement 
 date (t=0) 
 
Finally, the daily abnormal returns are cumulated across the event windows (-t, +t). This is done 
to adjust for 1) potential leakage of information or slow adjustment of prices to announcement 
information; 2) control the possible inaccuracy of the database of one day. I calculate the 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for a 5 day window (-2, +2) around the announcement of the 
transaction. The formula is as follows: 
 
           
   ∑      
 
     
VI. Results 
 
This section provides the results for the tests introduced in Section IV. I provide robustness 
checks to the methods used in the following section and shed more light on the results introduced 
here.  
 
6.1 Excess cash ratio 
 
Excess cash ratio, the key dependent variable in my study, is estimated according to Opler et al. 
(1999). According to Opler et al. (1999) the operational, transactional investment related motives 
imply that there exists a required level of cash reserves, which consequently forms company 
specific optimal liquidity levels. Based on these levels cash reserves can be measured for each 
firm. Reflecting this required cash reserve on annual cash holdings for my sample firms, the 
excess cash ratio is derived. Following Opler et al. (1999), I perform a pooled time-series cross-
sectional OLS regression with year dummies to estimate the firm’s required cash reserve. The 
estimation is performed using a sample of 3,788 firms operating in the EU-15 countries during 
the period 1999-2010. The total sample totals to 45,336 firm years. The mathematical 
representation of the estimation is as follows: 
 
Cash reserve ratioit = β1MTBit + β2SIZEit + β3NWCASTit + β4CAPEXASTit + 
β5LEVit + β6INDSIGMAit + β7DIVDUMit + γYDUM + εit 
(1) 
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where i and t index the firm and year, MTB is the market-to-book ratio of equity, SIZE is the 
logarithm of sales in millions of euros, CFAST is net income over book value of assets, 
NWCAST is net working capital over book value of assets, CAPEXAST is capital expenditure 
for year i over book value of assets in year i, LEV is total long-term debt over total assets, 
INDSIGMA is the mean cash-flow standard deviation of firms in the same 2-digit SIC code 
industry (cash flow is deflated by total assets and standard deviation is calculated over a period of 
5 previous years), DIVDUM is a dummy variable set to one if the firm pays dividends in year t 
and zero otherwise, YDUM are year dummies. 
 
Figure 2: Distribution of excess cash ratios 
  
Figure 2 shows the distribution of excess cash reserve ratios across the 45,336 firm years
14
. Due 
to the large number of observations, the distribution tends towards normality. A larger percentage 
of firm years, are below zero (60.4 percent), whereas the distribution is more skewed towards the 
right side. Calculating the observations at three standard deviations away from the average, this is 
5.4 percent more in the right end than the left end. Based on the distribution the quartile 
thresholds are as follows: Q1-Q2: -0.075; Q2-Q3: -0.0228; Q3-Q4: 0.043. 
 
                                                 
14
 The coefficients for Eq. (1) are as follows: β1= 0.002, β2= 0.176, β3= 0.000, β4= 0.153, β5= 0.347, β6= 0.022, β7= 
0.532,  
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Excess cash ratio, defined according to Opler et al (1999), provides the cornerstone for 
differentiating between cash rich and non-cash rich firms. Table 3 presents results for excess cash 
ratios. Panel A reports the cash reserves for the bidders as reported at the end of the last whole 
year prior to the transaction. I again differentiate between hot and non-hot equity markets in 
reporting the average cash reserves, in absolute terms, relative to bidder total assets (%), and 
relative to deal value (%). Panel B shows number of bidders, average market-to-book ratios and 
the excess cash ratios based on excess cash reserve quartiles derived from Sample (2). In table 2, 
based on a sample of 45,336 firm years, I have derived excess cash reserve ratios for Sample (1). 
In Panel A cash reserve ratios are shown for firms for the overall sample and the two subsamples 
for hot and non-hot equity markets. Looking at the differences in cash reserves between hot and 
non-hot markets, the larger bidder cash reserves in hot equity markets is a direct reflection of the 
better economic state. Cash is accumulated at a higher rate due to greater demand, whereas the 
opposite is true for non-hot equity markets. Similarly, the asset base is inflated in market up 
swings, which is seen in the lower cash reserve ratio (cash reserve / total assets). The most 
significant difference is seen in the implied deal values, where the cash reserves are 39.03 percent 
of the deal value on average in hot markets and 69.72 percent in non-hot markets. This is 
consistent with the merger wave hypothesis (Rhodes-Kropf et al., 2005; Dong et al., 2005), 
according to which larger deals are completed in market highs due to the fact that it increases 
financing options
15
, appeal to using own stock as method of payment and inflates synergy 
possibilities. 
 
The quartiles are derived from Sample (2), where the quartile thresholds are -0.0750, -0.0229, 
and 0.0427 respectively for increasing quartile levels. The distribution of observations is close to 
uniform implying that bidders in the working sample do not differ largely from the larger firm 
sample. The percentage of bidders classified to be in Q1 in hot markets shows that the 
distribution is slightly more skewed to the right (lower end) than compared to the situation in 
non-hot equity markets. Therefore a bidder low on excess cash reserve is more probable to be in 
the lower quartile in hot markets than in non-hot markets. Interestingly, market-to-book is higher 
in the lower ends of the distribution in all market environments. Similarly, price-to-earnings, used 
as an alternative representation for growth opportunities, is unexpectedly high for the lower 
                                                 
15
 Credit markets are sensitive to market states due to the market-to-.market nature, where financing decisions are 
based on expected cash flows collateral that drive repayment and liquidity. 
40 
 
 
 
quartiles (Q1). This is unexpected especially for the non-hot equity subsample, as cash is usually 
perceived as a more valuable asset in more economic troughs due to liquidity and 
underinvestment problems. Excess cash ratios, calculated from the median of the firms in each 
quartile, and characterize the differences in hot markets compared to non-hot equity markets. The 
excess cash ratio is more dispersed where higher ratios are observed in the top quartile and lower 
ratios in the bottom quartile compared to non-hot markets.  
 
The number of bidders in each quartile provides an unexpected result: clustering bidders in the 
highest quartile is more pronounced in non-hot years than in hot-years. There are 3.1 percentage 
units less bidders in the top quartile compared to the bottom quartile in hot equity markets, 
whereas in non-hot equity markets the distribution is skewed more to the top quartile (4.5 
percentage units more in Q4 than in Q1). If market wide misevaluation would be more apparent 
in hot equity markets, the skewedness of the distributions would reverse. The statistics, therefore, 
do not backup the hypothesis that targets would overestimate synergies and accept equity offers 
in hot-equity markets.  
 
Comparing to Gao (2011), the results shown in Table 3 are both complementary and 
contradictory. Gao finds that the distribution of observations is significantly skewed to the higher 
end of the quartiles (49.28 percent of the overall bidders are in Q4). The distribution of European 
bidders is more uniform, where an equal percentage of bidders are in Q1 as in Q4 (23.57 
percent). Even though Gao uses different metrics for the market-to-book ratio, the behavior of the 
variable is analogous across sub-samples, but different inside the sub-sample. Higher market-to-
book ratios are detected in hot-equity markets than in non-hot. However, Gao finds that the ratio 
is decreasing following decreasing quartiles, whereas I find that highest market-to-book values 
are seen in the Q1 (26.11x and 29.52x for Q4 and Q1 respectively. As mentioned this is counter-
intuitive and is set subject to robustness checks later in the paper.  
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Table 3: Excess ratios across equity financed offer bidders     
 
 
6.2 Bidder share performance and CARs 
 
To estimate the announcement effect of excess cash reserve I inspect the share price reaction and 
the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) of stock financed acquisition bidders. In the first test, I 
differentiate between firms with an excess cash ratio of above zero (92
nd
 percentile) and other 
Panel A: Bidder cash reserve, bidder size  and deal value
Overall (988) Hot equity market (577) Non- hot equity market (411)
(1999-2010) (1999-2000 and 2005-2007) (2001-2004 and 2008-2010)
  
Bidder cash reserve (€mm) 10.99 11.17 10.77
(% of bidder assets) 6.30 % 5.82 % 6.57 %
(% of deal value) 50.65 % 39.03 % 69.72 %
Panel B: Bidder distribution across excess cash reserve ratio quartiles
Excess cash reserve ratio quartiles
Total Q4 high Q3 Q2 Q1
Overall
Number of bidders 594 140 182 132 140
(%) 100.00 % 23.57 % 30.64 % 22.22 % 23.57 %
Market-to-book ratio 0.97x 0.92x 0.89x 0.99x 1.38x
Price over earnings 20.65x 20.55x 19.37x 18.95x 27.33x
Excess cash ratio -0.0167 0.0930 0.0064 -0.0492 -0.1366
Hot equity market (1999-2000 and 2005-2007)
Number of bidders 353 80 98 84 91
(%) 59.43 % 13.47 % 16.50 % 14.14 % 15.32 %
Market-to-book ratio 1.03x 1.00x 0.91x 0.99x 1.47x
Price over earnings 21.01x 22.31x 20.44x 20.04x 26.11x
Excess cash ratio -0.0222 0.0973 0.0071 -0.0485 -0.1328
Non-hot equity market (2001-2004 and 2008-2010)
Number of bidders 241 60 84 48 49
(%) 40.57 % 10.10 % 14.14 % 8.08 % 8.25 %
Market-to-book ratio 0.89x 0.66x 0.86x 0.94x 1.14x
Price over earnings 18.42x 16.70x 17.60x 15.07x 29.52x
Excess cash ratio -0.0052 0.0886 0.0047 -0.0510 -0.1482
Excess cash ratios. Panel A reports descriptive statistics for bidder cash reserve during the overall sample period, and the hot (1999-
2000 and 2005-2007) and non-hot (2001-2004 and 2008-2010) equity market years. Bidder cash reserve is cash and marketable
securities (Thomson Reuters). Sample medians are reported. Panel B reports the number of bidders, the median bidder market-to- book
ratio of assets, and the median excess cash reserve ratio for the overall sample and each excess cash ratio quartile. Results are reported
for the overall sample period, the hot and non-hot equity market years. Cash reserve ratio is cash and marketable securities over total
assets. Excess cash reserve ratio is the difference between cash reserve ratio and its required level (estimated using a pooled time-
series cross-sectional OLS regression ith year dummies, following Opler at al. (1999). All bidder variables are measured at the fiscal
year ending prior to deal announcement. Percentage is reported below the number of bidders. Excess cash reserve ratio quartiles are
calculated each year based on all EU15 firms.
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firms and pool the firms to achieve an average for cash rich and non-cash rich firms. In the 
second test, I perform a regression analysis with the dependent variable being the CAR of bidder 
firms in a -2 to +2 day window of the transaction.  
 
For the 988 firms included in Sample (1), I have gathered two years of daily stock price data. The 
stock returns are matched to country indexes’ returns to derive the regression equation for normal 
returns. The difference between normal returns and actual returns for a window of -5 to +5 
around the announcement of the offer is calculated. The cumulative abnormal returns for a five 
day period around the announcement is calculated, where cash rich and non-cash rich firms are 
differentiated. 
 
Acquisitions provide us information of the outcomes of a firm’s investment decision. Assuming 
market efficiency, the outcomes of the transaction are a direct reflection of the investment 
decision relative to the value of the expected action (Harford, 2005). The prevailing market 
expectations are based on knowing the cash position of the bidder and therefore the outcome of 
the investment is compared to alternative ways of using funds – either stock repurchase or 
another acquisition target. Based on the fact that an acquisition outcome is relative, not absolute, 
the share price reaction may be considered positive or negative depending on the opportunities 
that a firm has. While this holds true to acquisitions made fully or partially by cash, the 
relativeness of the outcome holds true also for fully stock financed acquisitions. Having excess 
cash and still fully financing an acquisition with stock signals a preference to maintain the stock 
pile that the firm has accumulated. Whether or not the lagging corporate spending is seen optimal 
depends on the alternatives that are present. 
 
Inspecting the 11 day window (-5 to +5 days) around the acquisition presented in Figure 3, the 
negative announcement effect of an equity financed acquisition as reported in several previous 
research papers is corroborated. For the Panel A, inspecting the percentage point change in for 
the period t-2 to t+2, the cumulative abnormal returns decrease by 1.11 percent on average. 
Travlos (1987) and Wansley et al. (1987) find similar results, where an announcement effect of -
1.45 percent is documented by Travlos (1987). The results are according to Roll’s (1986) 
hypothesis. In addition, McCardle and Viswanathan (1994) and Jovanovic and Braguinsky 
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(2002) argue that exhausted internal growth opportunities could be used to explain the negative 
share price effect of equity bidders.  
 
Figure 3: Bidders cumulative abnormal returns around deal announcement  
 
 
Differentiating between cash rich and non-cash rich firms, the share price decrease is 1.15 
percent and 1.09 percent respectively. Korajcyk et al. (1991) hypothesize that stock bidders bear 
greater adverse selection risk after stock issues, which would explain the difference between the 
Panel A: All offers
Panel B: Hot equity market offers
Panel C: Non-hot market offers
Share price announcement effect. The figure shows the cumulative abnormal return of cash rich firms and non-cash rich firms. The
average is calculated for the 988 firms that are included in the M&A sample. Returns are reported for an event window of t-5 to t+5 days,
where t=0 is the announcement date of the transaction.
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two bidder classes. There is, however, a tendency that the share price rebounds to close pre-offer 
level when inspecting the returns beyond the four day window. For the dissected samples, the 
announcement effect varies significantly. The negative announcement effect in hot markets is 
emphasized, whereas for non-hot markets the negative effect is partially diluted. The 
announcement effect in hot markets, when inspecting again at the t-2 to day t+2 period, is -1.25 
percent and -1.04 percent for cash rich and non-cash rich firms. While the announcement effect is 
more negatively severe in hot markets, the effect is only -0.63 percent and -0.58 percent for cash-
rich and non-cash rich respectively in non-hot markets. A difference of -0.62 percent between the 
cash rich bidder CAR in the five day period is a direct implication of the stronger signaling effect 
in hot equity markets (Graham and Harvey, 2001; Hansen, 1987). Beyond the five day period, the 
adverse effect observed in hot equity markets is contradicted with high CARs during days t+3 to 
t+5. As the share price is seen to have overreacted to the announcement, I believe that markets 
adjust to this effect. In fact, the CARs converge to near-zero values at t+5. However, the figure 
envisages the implications of excess cash reserves on bidder CARs that are tested in a 
multivariate OLS regression in the following subsection.   
 
I construct two regression models to test the announcement effect of cash rich firms. According 
to Hypothesis 1.1, the first objective of this subsection is to confirm that a high excess cash ratio 
translates into lower CARs around the announcement of an equity financed acquisition, as shown 
graphically in Figure 2. I use an equation as follows: 
 
Bidder CARi = αi + β1Excashi + β2Controlsi + γINDDUMi + δYDUMi + εi 
 
where i indexes the firm; Excash is log(1+ Excess cash reserve ratio) measured from the latest 
reported full year figures prior to deal announcement. Control variables include bidder size (i.e. 
logarithm of total assets in millions of euros), bidder market-to-book ratio of equity
16
, bidder 
profitability is a bidder's return on assets, calculated as net income over book value of equity, 
overpay measures target shareholder's gain relative to bidder market value of equity, which is 
calculated by first taking the product of CAR, target market value of equity and the percentage of 
target stake sought by the bidder, and then dividing this product by bidder market value of equity, 
                                                 
16
 Market-to-book ratio of assets would be used, but market values for debt are not available. 
(2) 
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operating cash flow is a variable measured from the cash flow statement of a firm, deflated by 
total assets, relative deal value (i.e. deal value over bidder market value of equity), and dummy 
variables for diversifying and cross-border deals. The overpay is included in the model to account 
for the advantage that equity offers have against cash offers: the true value of equity offers are 
contingent on the cash flows of the combined firm, so that bidders can reduce this overpayment 
cost by sharing some of the target’s mispricing with the firm and its insiders. Thus, the choice 
between an all-stock offer and an all cash acquisition is driven by the trade-off between the 
overpayment cost and the probability that the bid will be successful. Further, according to the 
Hubris hypothesis (Roll, 1986), firm managers are overly optimistic on value creation capabilities 
and therefore pay too high premiums on targets. 
 
As stated, market wide information asymmetry is time varying, which should be captured by 
differentiating between hot and non-hot markets. Misevaluation is most severe in hot markets and 
causes too many stock offers to be accepted, as discussed by Shleifer and Vishny (2003), which 
should result in worse announcement effects. I therefore separate Sample (1) into hot and non-hot 
subsamples following the periods for different market conditions introduced in Section 2.4. If 
adverse selection of cash reserve were to be an explanation for more severe negative 
announcement effects for cash rich firms, β1 is expected to be more negative in hot markets. 
According to Moeller and Schlingemann (2005) cross-border acquirers have announcement 
returns of approximately hundred basis points less than domestic acquirers. I therefore expect the 
cross-border dummy variable to provide a negative β that captures the effect of increased 
uncertainty. Berger and Ofek (1995) show that corporate diversification strategies destroy value, 
which derives from the fundamental idea that firms should not attempt to do what investors can 
do better themselves, i.e. creating a diversified portfolio. Therefore I expect the diversifying 
dummy variable to have a negative effect on bidder CARs. 
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Table 4: The negative announcement effect of a bidder's excess cash ratio 
 
 
The results based on Eq. (2) are reported in Table 4. The results are according to my hypothesis 
as the presence of a negative price effect of a bidder’s excess cash reserve is confirmed. In model 
1, the coefficient of log(1+excess cash ratio) is -0.274, suggesting that a 1 percent increase in the 
excess cash ratio leads to a 27.4 basis point decrease in an average bidder’s announcement CAR. 
The result marks the validity of hypothesis 1.1, as excess cash reserves diminish in fact bidder 
share price returns. The finding is consistent with the hypothesis formalized by McCardle and 
Hot equity market Non-hot equity market
(1999-2000 and 2005-2007) (2001-2004 and 2008-2010)
Exp. 
Sign
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Excash (-) -0.274** -0.287** -0.223
(0.02) (0.03) (0.42)
Positive excess cash dummy (-) -0.016 -0.029** -0.004
(0.17) (0.02) (0.85)
Size (+/-) -0.008 -0.009 -0.002 -0.002 -0.020* -0.023**
(0.17) (0.11) (0.74) (0.80) (0.09) (0.04)
Market-to-book (-) -0.004 0.000 -0.002 0.000 -0.010 -0.008
(0.11) (0.85) (0.39) (0.59) (0.17) (0.25)
Profitability (+/-) -0.098*** -0.097*** -0.085* -0.084* -0.074*** -0.071**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.08) (0.01) (0.01)
Overpay (-) 0.014 0.014 -0.106 -0.143 0.286*** 0.291***
(0.80) (0.89) (0.47) (0.32) (0.01) (0.01)
Operating cash flow (+/-) 0.082*** 0.080*** 0.059 0.050 0.027 0.023
(0.00) (0.00) (0.16) (0.23) (0.61) (0.66)
Relative deal value (-) -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.005 -0.006
(0.80) (0.66) (0.87) (0.84) (0.85) (0.81)
Diversifying takeover dummy (-) 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.007 0.017 0.018
(0.36) (0.42) (0.47) (0.57) (0.47) (0.45)
Cross-border dummy (-) 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.001 0.001
(0.69) (0.72) (0.69) (0.72) (0.96) (0.98)
Constant 0.074* 0.082* 0.039 0.047 0.174* 0.191**
(0.10) (0.06) (0.47) (0.37) (0.05) (0.03)
Observations 448 448 268 268 180 180
Overall sample
The negative announcement effect of a bidder's excess cash reserve. This table reports OLS regression estimates of the
announcement effects of a bidder's excess cash reserve. The dependent variable is bidder announcement CAR from day -2 to day
+2 from a market model. Models 1 and 2 use the overall sample. Models 3 and 4 (5 and 6) use the deals announced during the
hot (non-hot) equity market period. Cash reserve ratio is cash and equivalents over total assets. Excess cash reserve ratio is the
difference between cash reserve ratio and its required level. Positive excess cash dummy is one if excess cash ratio is positive
and zero otherwise. Size is the logarithm of a bidder's book value of assets in million of euros. Log(market-to-book) is the
logarithm if a bidder's market-to-book ratio of equity. Profitability is a bidder's return on assets, calculated as net income over
book value of equity. Overpay measures target shareholder's gain relative to bidder market value of equity. It is calculated by
first taking the product of CAR, target market value of equity and the percentage of target stake sought by the bidder, and then
dividing this product by bidder market value of equity. Operating cash flow is a flow variable calculated as operating income
before depreciation - interest expenses - income taxes - preferred and common dividends, deflated by total assets. Relative deal
value is deal value divided by bidder total assets. Diversifying takeover dummy is one if a target operates in the same industry
classified by 1-digit SIC codes and zero otherwise. Cross-border dummy is one if the bidder and target domicile nations are
different, zero otherwise. p-values are in parentheses . *,** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
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Viswanathan (1994) and Jovanovic and Braguinsky (2002) that equity offers convey exhausted 
growth opportunities. Growth opportunities have an increasing role in determining market values 
of firms and therefore the negative announcement effect is increasingly negative as excess cash 
reserves are increasing. In hot equity markets, the negative announcement effect is underlined as 
the average bidder announcement CAR decreases by 28.7 basis points at 5 percent significance 
level. In contrast, the negative announcement effect is insignificantly related to excess cash 
reserve ratios in non-hot markets, which coincides with the adverse selection of cash reserve 
hypothesis. Reflecting the difference in hot and non-hot markets, the hypothesis of Rhodes-Kropf 
and Viswanathan (2004) is underlined. From the targets side, the estimation error of synergies is 
elevated in hot market conditions making them more apt to accept equity offers. In cases where 
the potential synergies are not reflected at a one-to-one relation across the market, the M&A case 
is not seen to enhance the combined entity’s operating performance in a way that would justify 
the use of equity. In non-hot market conditions, the effect is diluted as the market-wide 
overvaluation component is non-existent, which consequently does not provide basis to assume 
larger estimation errors of synergies. In model 2, the positive excess cash dummy variable is not 
significant; similarly for model 6, however model 4 shows a coefficient of -0.029 at 5 percent 
significance further supporting my hypothesis.  
 
Gamba and Triantis (2008) developed a model that endogenized dynamic financing, investment, 
and retention/ payout policies in order to analyze the effect of financial flexibility on firm value. 
They find that firms with more flexible capital, i.e. more cash or debt capacity, can partially 
compensate for costly external financing, indicating that investment and financial flexibility are 
substitutes to some extent. Now relating this to the hypothesis that maintaining financial 
flexibility is a reflection of growth, the share price reaction should not decrease along excess cash 
reserve. Therefore, the findings presented in Table 4 are partially in contradiction with the 
finding of Gamba and Triantis (2008) as I conclude that investment and financial flexibility are 
complementary in nature. 
 
Control variables are to a smaller extent statistically significant. Throughout the six models, 
profitability negatively affects bidder CARs. For models 1 and 2, it decreases CARs by 9.8 and 
9.7 basis points for every percentage increase in profitability. I find that the choice of equity 
financing in M&A cases should be biased towards unprofitable firms with higher market 
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valuations. Therefore profitability has a negative relation with bidder CARs as investors believe a 
higher signaling effect for profitable firms. This could be a result of highly profitable firms been 
seen as having competitive edge against peers, which is expected to diminish over time. 
Interestingly, market-to-book is not significant. I expected the relation to be negative as higher 
market-to-book ratios increase the possibility of overvaluation, which is consequently 
emphasized with equity offers. Overpay is similarly negligent in the overall and hot market 
sample, but significantly positive for non-hot markets. Reflecting the result to the hypothesized 
overvaluation component that is missing in non-hot equity markets, the result is surprising. If the 
trade-off of overpaying and probability of a successful bid is diminished under the low market 
conditions, overpaying should be significantly negative throughout all samples, and especially in 
non-hot markets. I find that the positive price reaction from overpaying is an indirect of 
acquisition rationale: a firm willing to pay high relative values for a target under uncertain market 
conditions exhibits a strong message of high event outcome expectations. Whether the outcomes 
present themselves as significant operational improvements through synergies or market 
positioning, the investors perceive the signal positively. The positive signal from paying with 
cash that is created from a higher transparency of the valuation levels of the bidder and target 
(Hansen, 1987) is diminished in cross-border acquisitions. Further, if cross-border acquisitions 
are associated with more information asymmetries, agency problems, and managerialism, the 
measures of the acquirer’s growth opportunities, market-to-book and 5-year sales growth, play a 
more important role in explaining the cross-section of acquirer returns. This is, however, not the 
case here, as conducting a regression analysis for 675 cross-border acquisitions with the same 
parameters as in model 1, did not provide significantly different values.  
 
Comparing the results of Gao (2011) on U.S. data, the effect of excess cash reserve ratio is 
similar for European firms. For U.S. firms, the coefficient for log(1+Excess cash ratio) is slightly 
more negative, being -0.585 significant at 1 percent. The coefficient difference of 0.311 is not 
seen dependent on the differences between investor behavior or market efficiencies between the 
two continents, but more an echo of the sampling methods used and higher level of noise in the 
European context. Control variables are similarly largely consistent with the findings of Gao. 
Differences eloquent to mention are market-to-book, size and profitability. Where I find that 
market-to-book and size are statistically insignificant in explaining equity financed acquisitions, 
Gao finds both to be significant at 1 percent. Both independent variables are seen to affect 
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negatively CARs on the basis of overvaluation and asymmetry of information. My findings are 
similar in direction; however they do not match the magnitude or significance that U.S. data 
provided. Profitability is controversial: I find profitability to be negative and significant at 1 
percent whereas Gao finds it to have no significance. Based on the free cash flow hypothesis, 
profitability would be assumed to have negative implications on cash offers, but this should not 
be the case for equity offers.  
 
Transparency to bidder standalone value is expected to affect announcement effects. The 
probability that the bidder would subject itself to overvaluation speculation is greater if 
asymmetric information is small. As Gao (2011), I use tangible relative assets (tangible assets 
diluted by total assets) as a measure of information asymmetry between the bidding firm 
managers and investors
17
. I use a dummy variable, HighT, to indicate a bidder in the highest 
relative tangible assets quartile. A regression equation is formed where HighT is interacted with 
bidder excess cash as follows: 
 
Bidder CARi = αi + β1Excashi*HighT + β2Controlsi + γINDDUMi + δYDUMi + 
εi 
 
Figure 4 shows a bubble chart of the Bidder CARs and excess cash ratios across Sample (1). 
HighT bidders are differentiated from the rest of the bidders by a color scheme: dark grey - 
bidders having a tangible assets ratio in quartile 2 through quartile 4; light grey - bidders having a 
tangible assets ratio in quartile 1 (HighT). The figure captures partially the reasoning for why I 
use the methodology applied by Gao (2011), as when inspecting the distribution of HighT 
bidders it becomes apparent that the observations tend towards the top right quadrant. The size of 
the bubble, indicating the relative number of firms in each of the four quadrants, includes 30.5 
percent of firms with high tangible assets ratios in the top right quadrant, while there are only 
18.7 percent of firms with lower ratios. The distributions are relatively similar in the top left and 
bottom right quadrants. The bottom left quadrant shows, however, that even though the relative 
number of firms in having high tangible asset ratios exhibit lower CARs and lower excess cash 
ratios. 
                                                 
17
 Methodology following Harris and Raviv (1991) and Leary and Roberts (2010). 
(3) 
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Figure 4: Bidder CAR vs. excess cash ratio 
 
 
Myers identified already in 1984 that asymmetric information may be unnecessary if transaction 
costs alone can produce pecking order if they are higher for debt than for retained earnings and 
higher yet for external equity. In addition, if asymmetric information problems are avoided with 
issuing equity the pecking order financing disappears. Firms do avoid issuing risky securities in 
ways that involve asymmetric information problems, but financing decisions do not follow the 
pecking order. Adverse selection of cash reserve is therefore expected to be reflected in a positive 
β1, as tangible relative assets are expected to off-set the uncertainty in bidder valuation levels. In 
Table 5, this effect is seen in the -0.349 coefficient for excess cash reserve ratio and 0.464 
coefficient for the HighT interacted variable in model 1. It can be, thus, concluded that lowering 
the level of information asymmetry enhances the investor reaction to an equity financed deal. 
Both results are significant at a 1 percent level. Relating these results to the paradox between 
Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow theory and Myers’ and Majluf’s (1984) adverse selection of equity 
theory, the implication is that asymmetries of information imposed on the equity financed deal 
increase the adverse selection of cash. The discussed paradox is not directly tested in this study
18
, 
                                                 
18
 Gao (2011) argues that the agency costs of free cash flow are entirely removed when inspecting purely equity 
financed transaction. I find that, when linking it to monitoring costs of cash holdings, the free cash flow theory 
The figure shows the bidder CARs and excess cash ratios, while differentiating between bidders having a high (top quartile)
tangible assets ratio (tangible assets / total assets). The x-axis is the bidder cumulative abnormal returns for a five day window
around the announcement of the offer. The y-axis is the excess cash reserve ratio as estimated from the latest annual statement
available. The bublle size is the relative number of firms in the corresponding group. The figure consists of 453 bidder.
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however the context of excess cash reserve is well argued to reflect it. Excess cash reserve is 
reported to have a positive effect on CARs where there is low a low level on information 
asymmetry. Even though, taking a sample of only equity financed acquisitions levies the free 
cash flow dilemma, the impact of the HighT dummy can be argued that the agency costs of free 
cash flow outweigh adverse selection of equity. In a study conducted by Drobetz et al. (2010), the 
authors find results in the similar direction. They study the effects of the two contradicting 
theories on the valuation levels of German firms and find that the market value of cash is 
significantly reduced when a firm faces a higher level of information asymmetry. 
 
In model 3, I differentiate between Common Law countries and Code Law countries. Even 
though the coefficient for log(1+excess cash) follows the results achieved for the whole sample, 
the coefficients are significantly negative only for the Common Law countries (statistical 
significance at 5 percent level). Even though the impact of excess cash reserve is more negative 
in the UK and Ireland, the abnormal return in these countries is 0.29 percent higher than in 
Continental Europe. The results are according to the results of La Porta et al. (1997), as abnormal 
returns are higher in countries with better investor protection, and also reflects the more efficient 
market prevailing in Common Law countries. The Code Law subsample is relatively small in 
size, 127 observations, which dilutes the significance of the test. Due to the difference in the 
sample sizes between the two different legislative regions, the comparison of the coefficients 
would be based on a relatively unstable platform. Nevertheless, inspecting the regulatory and 
taxation differences discussed in Section 3.2, the results exhibit two aspects: 1) the effect is more 
apparent and statistically valid in Common Law countries; 2) information asymmetry is in a 
pronounced role in countries where investor protection is better. In addition, Drobetz et al. (2010) 
find that the market value of cash is higher if investor protection is better. Also in this light the 
presented results are in-line, since better investor protection is assumed to have a levitating effect 
on bidder CAR’s when there are lower levels of information asymmetry. The coefficient of the 
cross-border dummy is negligible in both legislative areas. This is surprising as several authors, 
including Udding and Boateng (2009) and Martynova and Renneboog (2009) find that UK based 
firms engaged in cross-border M&A activity experience higher returns than in other countries.  
 
                                                                                                                                                              
becomes relevant also in this approach. I argue that maintaining a high cash ratio beyond optimality is adjacent to 
value destroying investments and therefore can be tested indirectly with different levels of information asymmetries. 
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Table 5: The announcement effect of excess cash reserve accounting for high tangible assets 
 
 
 
(3)
Code Law Common Law
Excash (-) -0.349*** -0.059 -0.322**
(0.01) (0.76) (0.04)
Excash*HighT (+) 0.464*** 0.098 0.474*
(0.01) (0.78) (0.06)
Positive excess cash dummy (-) -0.024*
0.071
Positive excess cash dummy*HighT (+) (0.03)
0.224
HighT (+) 0.015 -0.001 0.073** -0.004
(0.52) (0.97) (0.02) (0.89)
Market-to-book (-) -0.002 0.000 0.003 -0.002
(0.33) (0.89) (0.47) (0.49)
Size (+/-) -0.008 -0.010* -0.010 -0.009
(0.17) (0.08) (0.26) (0.27)
CAPEX (+/-) -0.049 -0.087* 0.170 -0.071
(0.36) (0.07) (0.23) (0.30)
Collateral (+) -0.006 -0.007 -0.192** 0.050
(0.91) (0.89) (0.03) (0.44)
Profitability (+/-) -0.092*** -0.095*** -0.178*** -0.059**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Overpay (-)
Operating cash flow (+/-) 0.052** 0.075*** 0.023 0.048
(0.03) (0.00) (0.76) (0.75)
Relative deal value (-) -0.001 -0.001 0.030 -0.001
(0.68) (0.64) (0.10) (0.11)
Cross-border dummy (-) 0.005 0.005 -0.011 0.004
(0.64) (0.65) (0.46) (0.78)
Diversifying takeover dummy (-) 0.011 0.010 0.026 0.007
(0.34) (0.40) (0.10) (0.62)
Constant 0.066 0.093** 0.107 0.080
(0.14) (0.04) (0.16) (0.20)
Observations 411 412 114 297
(1) (2)Exp. Sign
The weaker negative aanouncement effect of excess cash reserve for a bidder with high tangible assets. This table reperts OLS
regression estimates of bidder announcement CAR on bidder excess cash reserrve, an ineraction term of bidder excess reserve and a
high-tangibility-bidder dummy variable (HighT), and control variables. The dependent variable is bidder announcement CAR from day -
2 to day +2 from a market model. A dummy variable, HighT, is interacted with log(1+Excess Cash Reserve Ratio) (model 1) or positive
excess cash dummy (model 2). HighT is one if a bidder belongs to the highest relative tangible assets quartile of the sample. Relative
tangible assets is measured as the sum of receivables, inventories and capital investments, deflated by total assets. Cash reserve ratio is
cash and equivalents over total assets. Excess cash reserve ratio is the difference between cash reserve ratio and its required level.
Positive excess cash dummy is one if excess cash ratio is positive and zero otherwise. Size is the logarithm of a bidder's book value of
assets in million of euros. Log(market-to-book) is the logarithm if a bidder's market-to-book ratio of equity. Profitability is a bidder's
return on equity, calculated as net income income over book value of equity. Overpay measures target shareholder's gain relative to
bidder market value of equity. It is calculated by first taking the product of CAR, target market value of equity and the percentage of
target stake sought by the bidder, and then dividing this product by bidder market value of equity. Operating cash flow is a flow variable
calculated as operating income before depreciation - interest expenses - income taxes - preferred and common dividends, deflated by
total assets. Relative deal value is deal value divided by bidder market value of assets. Diversifying takeover dummy is one if a target
operate in the same industry classified by 1-digit SIC codes and zero otherwise. Cross-border dummy is one if the bidder and target
domicile nations are different, zero otherwise. p-values are in parentheses . *,** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%
respectively.
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6.3 Probability of using cash as consideration 
 
Assuming target managers are rational ‘lemon’ bidders are removed by requiring them to use 
cash as consideration. This lowers the probability of cash rich firms using stock as the completion 
of the transaction is set contingent to the method of payment. As discussed earlier, target 
managers may misinterpret overvaluation for synergies. In order to test the relation between 
excess cash reserves and the propensity of bidders using stock, I form a set of logistic models 
according to Martin (1996) and Faccio and Masulis (2005). Slightly deferring from the original 
specifications, I make the same modification for the excess cash variable as Gao (2011), where he 
sets log(1 + Excess Cash Reserve Ratio) as the key independent variable. In addition, as Gao 
(2011) I augment the sample of all-stock financed deals by mixed and cash financed deals in 
order to construct a model where the dependent variable is one if all stock financed acquisition 
and 0 otherwise. The regression equation is as follows:  
 
Using stocki = α + βExcashi + γControlsi + δYDUMi + εi 
 
where the i indexes the firm, Excash is log(1 + Excess cash reserve ratio), YDUM is a vector of 
year dummy variables 1999-2010 and Controls is a vector of control variables. Control variables 
include bidder size (i.e. logarithm of total assets in millions of euros), bidder market-to-book 
ratio of equity
19
, bidder average sales growth in the 4 years prior to deal announcement, bidder 
industry-adjusted leverage (i.e. long-term debt over total assets), bidder collateral (measured as 
tangible assets), relative deal value (i.e. deal value over bidder market value of equity), and a 
dummy variable for diversifying deals and cross-border acquisitions. Hansen (1987) argues that 
the advantage of making a stock offer increases with relative size of the target compared to the 
bidder. As relative size increases, the influence of the target’s performance and value on the 
performance and value of the combined firm increases. Here, overpayment cost is inflated and 
consequently the advantage of an equity offer is emphasized. 
 
Target managers may overestimate synergies in hot equity markets more probably than in non-
hot equity markets, which causes more stock financed offers to be accepted than expected and 
might distort the β in Eq (4). Hence, I form another equation that differentiates between hot and 
                                                 
19
 Market-to-book ratio of assets would be used, but market values for debt are not available. 
(4) 
54 
 
 
 
non-hot markets where I anticipate the probability to use stock to be lower in non-hot equity 
markets compared to hot equity markets. This model is represented as follows:  
 
Using stocki = αi + β1Excash(non-hot years)i + β2Excash(hot years)i + γControlsi 
+ δYDUMi + εi 
 
where Excash(non-hot years) is the bidder excess cash reserve of the deals announced in non-hot 
equity markets (2001-2004 and 2008-2010) and Excash(hot years) is the bidder excess cash 
reserve of the deals announced in the hot equity markets (1999-2000 and 2002-2005). β1 is 
expected to be lower than β2. I also perform separate regression for a segmented sample. I pool 
the EU-15 countries according to legislation, where Continental EU-15 countries are classified 
into the same pool (Code) and U.K. and Ireland in another pool (Common). This model follows 
the Eq. (5) with the exception that the variance of the residual is not constrained i.e. variance in 
group 1 is not constrained to equal the variance in group 2. Here, the underlying hypothesis is 
that there exist differences between the two regions that are driven by differences in business 
environments as discussed in Section 3.2.  
 
Inspecting Panel A in Table 6, it can be concluded that there are significant differences in the 
corporate profiles for all stock offers and other offers. The most notable and controversial 
difference is the excess cash ratio, which is statistically significantly lower for cash and mixed 
offers. Reflecting this on the Pecking Order theory, it is clear that underlying assumptions for it 
are violated. Firms with higher excess cash ratios have more cash on a relative basis compared to 
bidders using different methods of payment. Compared other bidders, stock bidders have higher 
market-to-book ratios and higher average sales growth, where the differences 0.391 and 0.134 
respectively. The market-to-book difference translates into a difference of 0.466x
20
, 
corresponding a shareholder value of EUR 2.446bn based on average market capitalizations of 
equity bidders, where the hypothesis that the null hypothesis is rejected at 5 percent. Average 
sales growth is statistically different at 1 percent significance, which is a reflection of the market-
to-book difference. It may be argued that historical growth is translated into future growth 
opportunities that are consequently echoed in the share price. Size and leverage are not 
significantly different across the offer types. To the extent that foreign targets are more difficult 
                                                 
20
 0.9732 and 1.4392 for other bidders and stock bidders respectively using exp(log(market-to-book)). 
(5) 
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to evaluate I expected acquirers to prefer equity as the form of payment more often. In cross-
border acquisitions the target is frequently unwilling to accept foreign equity, which forces the 
acquirer to pay with cash (Gaughan, 2002).  
 
Panel B reports the logistic results. Model 1 is based on Eq. (4). The coefficient for log(1+excess 
cash ratio) is -6.229 and statistically significant at 1 percent. This outcome conveys that there 
exists a negative relation between excess cash and the probability of using equity as a method of 
payment in M&A. The coefficient of log(1+excess cash ratio) suggests that a one standard 
deviation increase in the variable reduces the probability of using stock by 4.59 percent, which is 
calculated based on the marginal effect
21
. Other independent variables seem to have significant 
impact on equity offers. Log(market-to-book) affects positively the decision to use equity as 
consideration, which has two opposite implications: 1) overvaluation (Rhodes-Kropf et al., 2005; 
Dong et al., 2006) is seen as an determinant for equity offers; 2) Precautionary motives do not 
restrain managers from using external financing (assuming market-to-book exhibits growth 
opportunities). According to the precautionary motive, potential underinvestment problems are 
induced by costs associated with higher external financing decision and are incurred by higher 
growth opportunities. In this light, the sign of the four year growth predictor variable is according 
to theory (Opler et al., 1999). On the other hand, average sales growth increases the probability of 
using equity by 0.94 percent at 1 percent significance. This is contrary to the precautionary 
motive as growth opportunities related to future growth should decrease the probability of equity 
financing.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21
 Coefficients are translated into marginal effects using .mfx compute in stata. A marginal effect of an independent 
variable x is the partial derivative, with respect to x. Mathematically represented: 
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Table 6: Logistic estimation of the probability of using stock 
Panel A: Summary statistics
Overall
All-
stock 
Other 
offers
Difference
Company characteristics (median)
Excess cash reserve ratio -0.044 -0.017 -0.047 0.031***
log(market-to-book) 0.328 0.364 -0.027 0.391**
Average sales growth in previous 4 years 0.114 0.240 0.106 0.134***
Size 9.362 8.211 9.496 -1.284
Leverage 0.152 0.106 0.159 -0.053
Collateral 0.388 0.111 0.461 -0.350
Deal characteristics
Relative deal value 0.043 0.094 0.038
Diversifying takeover dummy 1220 (30.3 %) 197 (33.2 %) 1023 (29.7 %)
Cross- border dummy 1301 (32.3 %) 190 (32.0 %) 1111 (32.3 %)
Number of deals 4033 594 3439
Panel B: Logit regression results
Dependent variable: one for all-stock offers, zero otherwise (1) (2) (3)
Exp. 
Sign
Coef.
Marginal 
Effect
Coef.
Marginal 
Effect
Common Code
Excash (-) -6.229*** -0.426 -2.321* -5.133***
(0.00) (0.07) (0.00)
Excash non-hot equity market years (-) -7.650*** -0.518
(2001-2004 and 2007-2010) (0.00)
Excash hot equity market years (-) -5.465*** -0.370
(1999-2000 and 2005-2007) (0.00)
Market-to-book (+) 1.015*** -0.001 1.017*** -0.001 2.724*** 4.491***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Average sales growth in previous 4 years (+/-) 0.005*** 0.000 0.005*** 0.000 -0.011 0.006
(0.00) (0.00) (0.17) (0.20)
Size (-) -0.723*** -0.049 -0.706*** -0.048 -1.419*** -0.775***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Leverage (+) 0.193 0.013 0.186 0.013 -0.196 0.612
(0.62) (0.64) (0.79) (0.38)
Collateral (-) -3.285*** -0.224 -3.308*** -0.224 -2.574*** -4.589***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Relative deal value (+) -0.021 -0.001 -0.019*** -0.001 -0.009 0.000
(0.34) (0.39) (0.68) (1.00)
Diversifying takeover dummy (+/-) -0.001 0.000 -0.009 -0.001 0.071 0.087
(0.99) (0.94) (0.71) (0.65)
Cross-broder takeover (-) 0.488*** 0.036 0.497*** 0.036 1.077*** 0.589***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant 5.742*** 5.628*** 11.827*** 7.032***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Pseudo R 0.270 0.271 0.451 0.452
Observations 3785 3785 1473 2266
Logistic estimation of the probability of using stock. This table reports the results of logistic regressions that examine how excess cash reserve
affects the propensity of using stock when a takeover offer is made. Sample period is 1999-2010. The dependent variable is one for an all-stock
offer and zero otherwise. In panel A, summary statistics are reported respectively for all takeover offers, all-stock offers and other offers (i.e. cash
or mixed). For continuous varables, medians are reported. A ranksum test is used to test the statistical significance of the differences between all-
stock offers and other offers. Percentages of ones and zeros for the overall and subsamples are in parentheses. Panel B reports regression
estimates. Size is the logarithm of a bidder's book value of assets in million of euros. Log(market-to-book) is the logarithm if a bidder's market-to-
book ratio of equity. Profitability is a bidder's return on equity, calculated as net income income over book value of equity. Overpay measures
target shareholder's gain relative to bidder market value of equity. It is calculated by first taking the product of CAR, target market value of equity
and the percentage of target stake sought by the bidder, and then dividing this product by bidder market value of equity. Operating cash flow is a
flow variable calculated as operating income before depreciation - interest expenses - income taxes - preferred and common dividends, deflated by
total assets. Relative deal value is deal value divided by bidder market value of equity. Diversifying takeover dummy is one if a target operate in
the same industry classified by 1-digit SIC codes and zero otherwise. Cross-border dummy is one if the bidder and target domicile nations are
different, zero otherwise. p-values are in parentheses. *,** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
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Size and collateral decrease the probability by 3.37 percent and 3.27 percent respectively, which 
is seen to be a function of debt capacity. Large firms, with more stable cash flows and more 
tangible assets used as collateral are more likely to finance M&A partially with debt financed 
cash (subject to their leverage which is not a statistically significant variable). Bidder size is as 
expected, where lower bankruptcy costs, better capital market access, and higher regulatory costs 
of stock offer impose a higher readiness to use cash as consideration for large firms. Collateral is 
negative and significant at 1 percent, which is according to the theoretical framework of Myers 
(1977) that states moral hazard to increase inversely to tangible assets. Along moral hazard, cost 
of debt is increased, which makes equity financing more attractive. Hovakiminian et al. (2001) 
find a positive correlation between tangible assets and leverage, which would imply that leverage 
should also be inversely correlated to the probability of using equity (Appendix C shows a 
correlation matrix of all control variables). Leverage and relative deal value are not significantly 
different across the offer types. Therefore the results are not consistent with Faccio and Masulis 
(2005) who find that all three variables are significant at 1 percent level and their coefficients are 
all of the expected signs. In contrast to Faccio and Masulis (2005), Martin (1996) neither finds 
leverage nor relative deal value significant. Therefore the decision to use equity as a method of 
payment is not related to the easiness of raising debt capital or financial constraint of raising 
more debt. 
 
One unexpected result in Table 6 is the coefficient for the cross-border transaction dummy. This 
finding is also contrary to the assumption that foreign shareholders would be disinclined to accept 
shares of foreign firms (Gaughan, 2002). It could be assumed a higher proportion of cross-border 
acquisitions to be financed with cash, following the home-bias effect. The variable imposes a 
positive relation between the use of equity and cross-border acquisition at 5 percent significance. 
There are a few explanations that could explain this finding: 1) firms tend to capitalize on the cost 
advantages by acquiring foreign firms domiciled in low cost countries; 2) as a result of the 
Eurozone, firms face a larger pool of competitors and generally a large number of firms face 
expansion pressure, 3) firms having a widely dispersed ownership have a low threshold to use 
equity financing; 4) the formation of the euro has mitigated currency risk and reduced home bias 
(Martynova and Renneboog, 2006). These all potentially account to the positive relation of equity 
financing and cross-border activity, however, the results are counter-intuitive and therefore are 
further inspected in Section 6.4. 
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In model 2, differentiating between hot and non-hot equity markets the effect is amplified further. 
In hot markets the log odds of using equity, decreases by a factor of 5.65 whereas it decreases by 
7.65 in non-hot markets. Further, in non-hot conditions one standard deviation change in 
log(1+excess cash reserve), the probability of using stock decreases 5.59 percent, which is clearly 
lower than in hot markets (-3.99 percent). This underlines an aspect discussed adjacent to Table 1 
– targets overestimate synergies and accept too many stock offers in hot markets and reflects on 
the findings of Hansen (1987), where the ‘contingency pricing effect’ increases the probability of 
using stock as consideration in the presence of uncertainty about the target’s value. As 
information asymmetries and agency costs are emphasized in economic troughs, the findings are 
consistent with theory. There is, however, a contradictory implication of the theory and results 
presented. If economic troughs increase the value of cash reserves, then the probability of using 
equity should be less negative than in hot equity markets given excess cash. The reasoning is that 
cash reserves are perceived more valuable and therefore the threshold to deploy it through 
acquisitions should increase. In other words, the probability of making a cash or mixed offer 
should decrease – consequently the probability of using equity should increase. I conclude that 
this is only a partially off-setting factor, where the probability of equity financing in economic 
troughs would actually be even lower otherwise.  
 
Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith and Servaes (2002) present evidence that the degree of shareholder rights 
explains cross country variations in corporate cash holdings; liquid assets are on average higher 
in countries with lower shareholder rights. Since a majority of Sample (1) includes U.K. bidders, 
I estimate my primary findings separately for U.K.-Irish and for Continental European bidders. In 
model 3, the differences between the two legislative areas are apparent. The relation between 
excess cash and equity financing seems to be more significant in Code Law countries. The 
negative effect is also more severe in Code Law countries, implying that firms domiciled in the 
UK and Ireland are less opposed to using equity while internal funds would be available also. 
Referring to Table 5, this result is slightly contradictory: excess cash reserves are not seen to 
affect payment method in M&A cases in Common Law countries, however the share price is 
affected more severely when equity is used. In respect of corporate behavior, there is, thus, a 
tendency in these countries to make corporate financing decisions that are not as shareholder 
value increasing as in Code Law countries. This might be a result of higher capital market 
activity in UK that drives firms to equity markets even though other options are available. 
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Market-to-book, size, collateral and cross-border acquisitions show similar results as for the 
pooled sample and are withholding in the same theoretical context. 
 
When marginal effects are considered, Common Law countries in general seem to be more 
sensitive to changes in predictor variables (please refer to Appendix E for a comprehensive 
comparison of the marginal effects). I find that for Common Law countries, the probability of 
using equity is reduced more for one standard deviation change in excess cash reserve, market-to-
book and size. Probability of using equity in Common Law countries demonstrates higher 
sensitivity to excess cash reserve as the probability decrease of using equity is 2.00 percent per 
one standard deviation. For Code Law countries the corresponding figure is -1.41 percent, which 
is also significantly lower than the pooled sample. Differences to the pooled sample are a result 
of lower variance within the different samples sizes, as the distribution for the pooled sample is 
relatively flatter meaning a larger impact of one standard deviation
22
. Market-to-book and size 
impact probabilities at even higher levels than excess cash reserve. A one standard deviation 
increase in market-to-book increases the probability of using equity by 4.57 percent, which 
comparing to Code Law countries is 3.14 percent. I assume this is a reflection of the financial 
market centered environment of especially the UK. An increase in size decreases the probability 
of using equity by 3.88 percent in Common Law countries whereas it decreases only 1.51 percent 
in Code Law countries. The choice of equity financing is not significantly affected by increases 
in the other variables, but a noteworthy point is that when looking at the median leverage in the 
subsamples, Continental Europe based firms seem to be more leveraged than U.K. or Irish firms, 
where leverage ratios are 21.5 percent and 14.4 percent respectively. Therefore, a higher leverage 
constrains additional debt issues or loans and equity is used instead. I do maintain a certain level 
of caution in drawing conclusions of differences between the two regions as the number of 
observations vary in the subsamples.  
 
 
 
                                                 
22
 When comparing the coefficients of predictor variables and marginal effects, the magnitude of the impact might be 
ambiguous: the marginal effect in Common Law countries is more severe even though the coefficient is smaller as 
reported in Table 6. The difference is due to the nature of the Logistic regression, where the direct regression 
coefficient does not signify change in probability, but rather the magnitude of the contribution of that variable.  
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𝑌 = [(∑ 𝑉𝑖 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)𝑡𝑖=1 + 1]    
6.4 Operating performance 
 
A method used initially by Kim and Weisbach (2008) and applied by Gao (2011) is used to 
measure how bidder excess cash ratio affects post-acquisition performance. I apply the method of 
the authors to my sample of mergers in European context 1999-2010 to see if the negative market 
reaction to acquisition announcements by cash-rich firms is partially explained by the 
expectations of poor operating performance. The method tracks seven accounting variables that 
are directly related to the uses of funds for the firms included in the sample. The relation between 
excess cash reserve and the seven accounting variables are used to derive an understanding of 
operating performance by triangulation. While operating cash flow is not directly tested, I find 
the test to be sufficient to provide meaningful results in answering the hypotheses. Operating 
cash flow return on assets is used as a measure for operating performance in order to remove the 
effect of short-term investments
23
. Average cash flow return on assets is calculated for both the 
target and the bidder over the pre-merger period (years -3 years through -1). The combined entity 
cash flow and total assets are an aggregate of the two separate entities. The post-merger operating 
performance is measured for years +1 through +4
24
. Operating performance is tested according to 
the following regression equation: 
 
Yt = αi + β1log(1+ Excess cash reserve ratio0) + β2log(Cash Reserve 
ratio0) + β3log(1+ Total Funds / Total Assets0 ) + β4Relative deal 
value + β5Size0 + εi 
 
where the i indexes the firm,                                                 for V= (funds used on) 
operations, capital expenditure, long-term debt reduction and acquisitions, and Y = ln[(Vt -V0) 
/Total Assets0 ) + 1] for V= cash, inventory and total assets, for t=1 to 4. t=0 denotes the year 
before deal announcement, and t=1 to 4 are the 1st to the 4th year after deal completion. At t=0, 
total assets, cash, inventory are the combined figures of bidder and target. At t=1 to 4, operating 
costs, capital expenditure, long-term debt reduction, acquisitions, cash, inventory and total assets 
are of the combined firm. The explanatory variables are all measured as the t=0 and represent 
                                                 
23
 The book value of total assets net of cash is used as the denominator, which slightly defers from the market value 
of total assets used by Healy, Palepu, and Ruback. 
24
 Year 0 is excluded to remove the effect of different merger accounting methods. Consolidation may be performed 
at year end or at the time of the merger. Therefore the results for year 0 are not comparable across the sample. 
(6) 
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only bidder characteristics. Explanatory variables include Cash reserve ratio
25
, Excess cash 
reserve (the difference between cash reserve ratio and its required level), Total fund (the sum of 
funds from operations, sales of property, plant and equipment, sale of common and preferred 
stock, long-term debt issuances, and other sources of funds, aggregated over the same time 
horizon as the dependent variable), Relative deal value (deal value over bidder market value of 
equity), and Size (the logarithm of a bidder's pre-acquisition book value of total assets in millions 
of euros). 
 
The expected signs for each explanatory variable are based largely on the Static Trade-off theory 
and the expectation of cash reserves to convey growth opportunities. The main focus of the 
analysis is on the excess cash reserve ratio variable, as it upholds the theoretical frameworks that 
are referred to in the expected signs. A broad interpretation of Miller and Modigliani (1958) firms 
adjust capital structures towards optimal levels. Based on this, I expect excess cash reserves to be 
a discontinuous state, where cash reserves converge toward optimal levels under time. Smith and 
Watts (1992) document a negative relationship between growth opportunities and debt ratios. 
Stein (1996), Hertzel and Li (2010), and Kim and Weisbach (2008) show that long-term debt 
reduction is positively related to stock issuance. Therefore I expect excess cash reserves to be 
positively related to debt reduction. Capital expenditures, acquisitions, and total assets are 
expected to be positively related to excess cash purely based on the growth opportunities 
hypothesis. The sign of operating costs is ambiguous as through growth expenses are increasing, 
but simultaneously cost synergies may affect in the opposite direction when exploited. Healy et 
al. (1992) show that merged firms have significant improvements in operating cash flow returns, 
resulting from increases in asset productivity. Based on the asset productivity increase the sign 
for operating costs is expected to be negative. 
 
                                                 
25
 Based on the correlation matrix (Appendix C, Panel C) the correlations between the explanatory variables are 
sufficiently low and hence autocorrelation is not seen as a problem in the model used. 
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Table 7: The effect of excess cash reserve on a bidder's post-acquisition uses of funds 
 
 Yt = αi + β1log(1+ Excess cash reserve ratio0) + β2log(Cash Reserve ratio0) + β3log(1+ Total Fundt / Total Assets0 ) + β4Relative deal value + β5Size0 + εi
log(1+Excess Cash Reserve Ratio) log(Cash Reserve Ratio) Total fund Relative deal size Size Obs Adj. R
2
Y t Exp. Sign β1 β2 β3 β4 β5
ΔCash 1 (-) -1.034*** 1.039*** 0.134*** -0.004 0.023*** 437 0.318
2 (-) -0.493*** 1.510*** 0.071*** -0.002 0.034*** 428 0.219
3 (-) -0.137 1.872*** 0.025 -0.004 0.062*** 431 0.096
4 (-) -0.201 0.453 -0.033 -0.002 0.039** 415 0.013
ƩLT Debt Reduction 1 (-) -0.981*** 0.065 0.159*** 0.001 -0.017 442 0.194
2 (-) -0.025 0.788 0.072*** 0.008 0.002 424 0.146
3 (-) 0.211 0.809 0.175*** 0.003 0.015 429 0.127
4 (-) 0.721 0.295 0.317*** 0.006 -0.006 441 0.163
ΔInventory 1 (+) 0.030 -0.042 0.024** 0.001 0.002 355 0.006
2 (+) 0.402*** -0.368 0.015 0.004 0.010* 351 0.034
3 (+) 0.251 -0.514 -0.016 0.004 0.016* 346 0.012
4 (+) 0.115 -0.154 0.000 0.004 0.011 345 0.009
ƩCAPEX 1 (+) -0.311*** 0.534*** -0.046*** 0.000 0.025*** 443 0.119
2 (+) -0.492*** 0.350*** 0.009 -0.001 0.016*** 435 0.156
3 (+) -0.407*** 0.398*** -0.003 0.000 0.018*** 435 0.076
4 (+) -0.359*** 1.527*** -0.156*** -0.002 0.025*** 442 0.178
ƩOper.Costs 1 (-) -2.715*** 3.040*** -0.010 0.010 -0.016 443 0.197
2 (-) -2.378*** 2.227*** 0.112** 0.006 -0.044** 435 0.188
3 (-) -1.325*** 0.993 -0.253*** 0.007 -0.051*** 435 0.066
4 (-) -2.232*** 1.616** -0.026 0.000 -0.091*** 442 0.159
ƩAcquisitions 1 (+) -0.257** 0.159 -0.094*** -0.001 -0.023*** 443 0.082
2 (+) -0.195 -0.175 -0.041** -0.002 -0.017*** 443 0.032
3 (+) -0.249* 0.369* -0.085*** 0.000 -0.019*** 435 0.062
4 (+) -0.297** -0.031 -0.081** 0.000 -0.033** 442 0.070
ƩTotal Assets 1 (+) 2.010** -1.381 0.923** 0.003 0.027 387 0.114
2 (+) 1.024 -0.936 0.206 0.004 0.034 322 0.004
3 (+) 0.020 -1.630 0.354 0.009 0.011 298 0.004
4 (+) 0.561 -2.182 0.656** 0.001 0.002 284 0.008
The effect of excess cash reserve on a bidder's post-acquisition uses of funds and changes in assets. This table reports regression results showing how a bidder's excess cash reserve affects its post-acquisition uses of
funds and changes in assets. The dependent variable is for V= (funds used on) R&D, capital expenditure, long-term debt reduction and acquisitions, and Y = ln[(Vt -V0) /Total Assetso ) +
1] for V= cash, inventory and total assets, for t=1 to 4. t=0 denotes the year before deal announcement, and t=1 to 4 are the 1st to the 4th year after deal completion. At t=0, total assets, cash, inventory are the
combined figures of bidder and target. At t=1 to 4, R&D, capital expenditure, long-term debt reduction, acquisitions, cash, inventory and total assets are of the combined firm. Cash reserve ratio is cash and
marketable securities over total assets measured in the year prior to the announcement. Excess cash reserve is the difference between cash reserve ratio and its required level. Total fund is the sum of funds from
operations, sales of property, plant and equipment, sale of common and preferred stock, long-term debt issuances, and other sources of funds, aggregated over the corresponding horizons. Relative deal value is deal
value deflated by pre-acquisition bidder market value of assets. Size is the logarithm of a bidder's pre-acquisition book value of total assets in million of dollars. *, **, **** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%
respectively. The cross-sectional regressions are specified below.
𝑌 = [(∑ 𝑉𝑖 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)𝑡𝑖=1 + 1]    
63 
 
Table 7 reports the effect of excess cash on the equity financed offer bidder’s post-acquisition 
uses of funds. The most significant impacts of excess cash reserves are on change on cash 
reserve, capital expenditures and operating costs. The first two years post the transaction, excess 
cash has a negative impact on cash reserve, implying that cash reserve tends towards normal 
levels. The sign remains negative through years 3 and 4, however statistical significance is lost. 
This underlines my hypothesis that excess cash reserve is not a static state that a firm intends to 
uphold, but rather an adverse situation. Observing capital expenditures and operating costs, 
negativity of excess cash effect is significant for all four years after the transaction. As the two 
dependent variables are a direct reflection of investments and operational growth, excess cash 
negativity is seen as a contradiction to growth opportunities. Operational efficiency enhancement 
due to synergies may be used to explain relative operational cost reduction, but the perception of 
excess cash reserve as a catalyst for the improvement cannot be made. Based on the coefficients 
it can be concluded that the relation between excess cash reserves and growth metrics does not 
reflect growth, but rather operational improvement. The results are consistent with the findings of 
Healy et al. (1992) and Cornett and Tehranian (1992) who also report operational improvements. 
When the operating cash flow of the combined entity is measured, the change for years 2-4 is 
positive, where changes are on average 3.4 percent, 6.4 percent, and 5.6 percent respectively. As 
total assets are also increasing along excess cash reserves at t=1 and t=2 as at least 5 percent 
significance, it can be stated that cash richness anticipates operational enhancement after equity 
financed transactions. The expected negative share price reaction is thus off-set by higher 
expected synergies and consequently higher fundamental improvement. Overall, regardless of the 
slight discrepancies in the results, the findings are essentially consistent with my hypothesis. 
 
When inspecting the adjusted R-squared figures, it becomes apparent that the explanation power 
of the model decreases along years after the transaction. This conveys that the static independent 
variables, all except Total Funds, become weaker in explaining the performance of a firm as time 
progresses. The result is intuitive, as economy and industry trends power change in firm behavior 
and historical events are lessened in value. Gao (2011) finds opposing results, as the explanatory 
power is increased from t=1 to t=4. I find that the difference arises from differences in specifying 
Total funds, where I take a net value of all financing activities whereas Gao inspects the cash 
inflows only. 
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Given that generalization cannot be made to the findings, as there are significant differences 
across industries, which are not accounted for in Eq. 6. For example, TMT (telecom, media and 
technology) firms are more apt to maintain high cash reserves irrespective of past M&A activity. 
I therefore, perform a robustness test on the results in Section 7.4, by matching firms to a selected 
peer group and inspect corporate behavior in a more enclosed universe. While excess cash is 
shown to impact changes in cash reserve and capital expenditures negatively, the cash reserve 
ratio of the bidder at the time of announcement has opposite implications. This highlights the 
need to adjust for industry differences, as the cash reserve ratios vary across industries also. 
Based on Table 7, changes in cash reserve are positively affected by high cash ratios. Similarly 
capital expenditures are increased as a result of having high cash ratios in the announcement year. 
VII. Robustness tests 
 
Econometrical models are subject to assumptions that are made when defining the model itself. In 
order to test the results presented thus far, I have included four additional tests to shed more light 
in explaining firm and investor behavior. In this section I test how industry and GDP growth 
affects the decision to use equity, correct for sampling bias in probability of using equity, 
formalize an econometric model that introduces possible determinants for using equity in cross-
border acquisitions, and analyze post-acquisition performance by matching cash rich firms to 
non-cash rich industry peers. 
 
7.1 Growth opportunities adjusted bidder announcement effects of excess cash 
 
Market-to-book has been argued to be an insufficient proxy for growth (Gao, 2011) and thus 
insufficient to capture the relation between excess cash ratio and growth opportunities. Hence, I 
perform a cross-sectional regression for Eq. (4) for all industries separately, where the constant 
term better absorbs the average cash reserve and reflects growth opportunities in each industry. In 
addition, I interact the log(excess cash reserve ratio) with a ternary variable marking level of 
growth for the five year historical GDP
26
 growth of the domicile country for each firm. I calculate 
                                                 
26
 Gross domestic product (GDP) is a measure of the economic activity, defined as the value of all goods and 
services produced less the value of any goods or services used in their creation. The calculation of the annual growth 
rate of GDP volume is intended to allow comparisons of the dynamics of economic development both over time and 
between economies of different sizes. 
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the GDP growth of the bidder domicile country because excess cash reserves are held in order to 
finance growth opportunites that are assumed to be prevalent in the domicile country as 
greenfield investments and similar cross-border investments are significantly rarer and therefore 
domicile investments are more likely. The GDP growths are retrieved from Eurostat database and 
are adjusted for inflation. Industry growths are calculated from the aggregate sales growth of 
firms operating in the specific industry. Differing from the GDP growth, the industry growth is 
calculated for the previous 2 years for two reasons: 1) to capture the most recent trend; 2) 
maintain a high sample size for the first years of the sample. When defining different categories 
of growth, I calculate the 33
rd
 and 67
th
 percentiles. The growth averages are calculated to be 4.63 
percent for High growth, 2.95 percent for Medium growth, and -0.19 percent for the Low growth 
category. GDP growth, categorized in three levels are descending from left to right. In addition, 
Table 8 is constructed so that the average industry growth over the two year period prior to the 
inspected M&A case are sorted in descending order. Here, it is important to acknowledge that the 
industry growth figures are averages calculated without a time dimension, i.e. the growth figures 
do not signify growth over any certain time period.  
 
I expect the coefficient of excess cash ratio to have a negative relation with growth. This is to say 
that where economic and industry growth is high, the probability of using equity as consideration 
decreases given cash richness. According to Jensen (1986) the positive monitoring effects of debt 
issues are not as strong for firms with high growth opportunities but no free cash flow. Such 
organizations will engage regularly in capital market activity to obtain capital. The contradictory 
aspect in the analysis, as mentioned in prior sections, is the translation of growth into firm value. 
Where growth enables higher valuation multiples, the probability of using equity is increasing 
regardless of cash reserve levels. This aspect is accounted by including the same control variables 
as in Eq. (4). When inspecting the other end of the spectrum, that is low GDP and industry 
growth I expect the value of cash reserves to increase the probability of using equity. This derives 
from the cash precautionary hypothesis under economic troughs.   
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Table 8: Effect of excess cash reserve on probability of using equity - Adj. for growth rates 
 
 
Table 8 provides two main results: 1) GDP growth is seen to influence the decision to use equity 
more than industry growth; 2) certain industries seem exhibit highly significant negative relations 
with excess cash and equity offers indpendent of GDP growth. Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 
– industry is calculcated to have the highest growth levels, which is translated into the most 
negative coefficent on excess csah reserve at 1 percent significance. Where this result is 
according to the growth hypothesis, statistical significance is lost with other levels of GDP 
growth. This implies that even though the industry has been observed to grow at substantial rates, 
the macroeconomic environment has not been suitable for using equity instead of cash as 
consideration. Looking at the lower end of industry growths, Mining and Construction inudstry 
grew only by 2.58 percent on average at the year prior to the acquisition. When GDP growth was 
high (4.63 percent on average) the excess cash reserve had only a negative relation with equity 
offers at 10 percent significance. This is surprising given that in medium growth macroeconomic 
environments, the coefficient was less negative but statistically significant at 1 percent. The 
second fastest growing industry, Services, exhibits a highly significant coefficients throughout all 
GDP growth categories. The interesting aspect in the industry is the magnitude of the coefficients 
in High growth category versus the Low growth category. The indudstry, with low capital 
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing (-) -9.150** -3.432 -5.658 14.70 % 278
(0.02) (0.34) (0.16)
Services (-) -4.970*** -1.395*** -7.843** 12.77 % 851
(0.00) (0.13) (0.00)
Transportation & Public Utilities (-) 0.151 -1.995 -2.898 8.38 % 818
(0.94) (0.53) (0.49)
Manufacturing (-) -2.993 -2.255 -2.706* 4.81 % 725
(0.19) (0.21) (0.10)
Wholesale & Retail (-) -4.158*** -4.051*** -1.076 3.11 % 318
(0.01) (0.00) (0.20)
Mining & Construction (-) -4.690* -2.250*** -1.440 2.58 % 679
(0.08) (0.01) (0.30)
Avg. GDP growth acq. t-1 4.63 % 2.95 % -0.19 %
Obs. 1268 1210 1191 3669
Exp. 
Sign
High growth
Medium 
Growth
Low growth Obs
Avg. industry 
growth acq-t-1
Effect of excess cash reserves on probability of using equity adjusted for industry and country growth. This table reports
coefficients for excess cash using the model Equity i = αi + β1Excashi + β2Controlsi +δYDUM i + εi. Industries are classified
according to ThomsonReuters SIC codes. p-values are in parentheses. *, **, **** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%
respectively.
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requirements, does not behave in a way that would enforce the growth hypothesis. Overall, while 
the coefficients are significantly negative in the High GDP growth category, both the strength of 
the coefficient and statistical significance is decreased in the Low GDP growth category. This 
underlines the precautionary hypothesis, that cash reserves are maintained under uncertain 
growth environment. The robustness test, hence, can be concluded to strengthen the theoretical 
frameworks that have been built around this certain empirical fragment.   
 
7.2 Sample selection bias correction for probability of using equity financing 
 
There exists some evidence that a firm’s characteristics determine whether the firm is active in 
the M&A market or not. I therefore perform self-selection corrections for the sample according to 
a two-step procedure by Heckman (1976, 1979). In the first stage, I estimate a Probit model of 
the probability that a firm makes a takeover offer in a year. The explanatory variables used in the 
Probit model are logarithm of excess cash ratio, logarithm of sales to proxy size, logarithm of 
market-to-book ratio, sales growth over the previous four years, working capital deflated by total 
assets, long-term debt over total assets, and standard deviation of operating cash flows over the 
previous four years. In the second stage, I calculate the inverse Mill’s ratio for each observation 
and include it in the estimations of Table 6, Panel B.  
 
In model 1, I have included the results presented initially in Table 6, Panel B. Model 2 presents 
results for the same model, with the difference that it includes the inverse Mill’s ratio derived by 
the Heckman procedure. The differences of the coefficients are presented in the third column of 
the table.  
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 Table 9: Sampling bias corrected probability of using equity in M&A cases 
 
 
Inspecting Table 9 it becomes apparent that coefficients presented previously in Table 6 are 
robust, but the model is subject to sampling bias. When accounting for sampling bias the 
coefficient of excess cash ratio is slightly diminished, but it still remains significant at 1 percent. 
The models 1 and 2 sustain the Wald test, which is signified by the high chi-squared value. The 
inverse mill’s ratio (IMR) in model 2 is significant at 1 percent. This suggests that there is 
selection bias in the sample, which decreases the robustness of the tests. When the coefficient of 
IMR is positive there are unobserved variables that both increase the probability of selection and 
a higher than average score on the dependent variable. As a result there are changes in both the 
coefficients of the control variables and their statistical significance. The importance of size is 
Excash (-) -6.229*** -5.895*** -0.334
(0.00) (0.00)
Market-to-book (+) 0.015*** -0.013*** 0.028
(0.00) (0.01)
Average sales growth in previous 4 years (+/-) 0.005*** 0.001*** 0.004
(0.00) (0.00)
Size (-) -0.723*** -0.045 -0.678
(0.00) (0.86)
Leverage (+) 0.193 -0.004 0.197
(0.62) (0.99)
Collateral (-) 3.285*** -3.294*** 6.579
(0.00) (0.00)
Relative deal value (+) -0.021 -0.004 -0.017
(0.34) (0.26)
Diversifying takeover dummy (+/-) -0.001 0.000 -0.001
(0.99) (1.00)
Cross-border takeover (-) 0.488*** 0.044*** 0.444
(0.00) (0.00)
Inverse Mill's Ratio (+/-) 0.482***
(0.00)
Constant 5.742*** -0.651 6.393
(0.00) (0.31)
Chi-squared 535.06 542.24
Wald test 0.000 0.000
Model 1 Model 2 Difference
Exp. 
Sign
Logistic estimation of the probability of using stock. This table reports the results of logistic regressions that examine how excess
cash reserve affects the propensity of using stock when a takeover offer is made. Sample period is 1999-2010. The dependent
variable is one for an all-stock offer and zero otherwise. Size is the logarithm of a bidder's book value of assets in million of
euros. Log(market-to-book) is the logarithm if a bidder's market-to-book ratio of equity. Profitability is a bidder's return on
equity, calculated as net income income over book value of equity. Relative deal value is deal value divided by bidder market
value of equity. Diversifying takeover dummy is one if a target operate in the same industry classified by 1-digit SIC codes and
zero otherwise. Cross-border dummy is one if the bidder and target domicile nations are different, zero otherwise. Inverse Mill's
ratio refers to the ratio of the probability density function to the cumulative distribution function of a distribution p-values are in
parentheses. *,** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
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decreased in model 2, which is controversial to the findings of Gao (2011) and Harford (2005). In 
addition, the coefficient of cross-border dummy is significantly lowered, which is more according 
to intuition and theoretical frameworks. However, the coefficient is still positive and significant 
at 1 percent, which contradicts to some extent the findings of Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001). 
Signs and significances of the control variable coefficients are largely consistent with the non-
sampling bias corrected coefficients. Statistical significance of size variable is lost, which 
signifies that firm size does not affect the choice of payment method. The difference in Models 1 
and 2 is an opposition to the findings of Faccio and Masulis (2005) as they propose that bidder 
size increases the probability of using cash in M&A cases. Statistical significance for collateral is 
also achieved in model 2, which emphasizes the moral hazard of having few tangible assets and 
high growth opportunities as proposed by Myers (1977). In general, the results do not vary 
significantly between model 1 and 2, which implies the sampling bias not to affect the 
interpretations presented in Section 6.3. 
 
7.3 Probability of using equity financing in cross-border M&A cases 
 
I find a similar trend of increasing proportion of cross-border deals in European context as 
Moschieri (2009). The proportion of cross-border deals in the inflated sample (Sample 3) 
increased form 15.1 percent in 1999 to 23.8 percent in 2010. There are several reasons for this 
increase: 1) growth by market expansion; 2) acquisition of special resources; 3) benefits of 
international diversification. Nevertheless, the increase in relative size of cross-border 
acquisitions compared to domicile acquisitions does not explain the result showed in Table 6. As 
discussed in Section 5.3 M&A cases where the bidder and the target are domiciled in different 
countries has a positive relation to the probability of using equity as consideration. Whether this 
is a function of the consolidation of currencies and an increased pressure for cross-border 
expansion, the result requires further scrutiny.  
 
As reported by Gaughan (2002) targets may be reluctant to accept foreign equity and thus the 
probability of using cash in cross-border acquisitions is increased. I find that the propensity to 
accept equity is contingent on certain pre-acquisition factors, which could explain the findings 
reported in Table 6. First, a bidder having operations in the target country prior to the event might 
lower the threshold to accept equity. I use international sales as a proxy for the international 
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presence. The variable used in Table 10 is deflated by the total sales to represent the proportion 
of international sales. Even though country sales data is not available, I expect that the coefficient 
is still positive as higher proportions of international sales increases the probability that the 
bidder firm has sales also in the target domicile country, which is hypothesized to increase the 
probability of using equity. Similarly, cross-listing is seen as a threshold lowering factor, as 
accessing the capital markets is easier in the target domicile. In addition, I estimate shareholder 
presence by the number of shareholders in the specific country. This is seen to increase the 
probability of offering equity as consideration. Credit rating dummy is included also to show how 
easily accessible data, without geographic boundaries, affects the payment of method in cross-
country M&A cases. I have included all three major credit rating agencies, namely Standard and 
Poor’s, Fitch, and Moody’s in determining whether the bidder has a credit rating or not in the 
year prior to the event. The same control variables as in Eq. (4) are used in order to maintain 
unity across the tests used in my study. The equation is presented as: 
 
Using stocki = αi + β1Excashi + β2Cross-listing dummyi + β3Presence in target 
countryi + β4International salesi + β5Credit rating dummyi 
γControlsi + δYDUMi + εi 
 
where Excach is log(1+ excess cash ratio), Cross-listing dummy is one if the bidder is listed in 
the country of target, Presence in target country is the number of shareholders in the target firm 
country, International sales is the percentage of international sales diluted by total sales, and 
Credit rating dummy is one if the bidder firm has a credit rating from one of the three largest 
credit rating agencies. For the control variables please refer to Eq. (4). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
(7) 
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 Table 10: Cross-border M&A cases - Determinants for using equity 
 
 
The negative effect of excess cash reserves loses significance when only cross-border 
acquisitions are considered. Where Table 6 presented significantly negative coefficients for 
excess cash reserve ratio, the results in Table 10 does not reinforce the previous findings. 
Throughout all four models the coefficient is negative but insignificant. Therefore, in cross-
border acquisitions the use of equity is not reflected on the availability of internal reserves. In 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Exp. Sign Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
Excash (-) -1.655 -1.565 0.861 -1.621
(0.25) (0.27) (0.73) (0.26)
Cross-listing dummy (+) 0.645
(0.35)
Presence in target country (+) -0.003
(0.61)
International sales (+) 1.612***
(0.01)
Credit Rating dummy (+) -0.171
(0.58)
Market-to-book (+) 2.050*** 2.040*** 2.472*** 2.053***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Average sales growth in previous 4 years (+/-) 0.006 0.006 0.012 0.006
(0.15) (0.15) (0.12) (0.16)
Size (-) -1.010*** -0.984*** -1.224*** -0.974***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Leverage (+) -0.124 -0.180 0.986 -0.137
(0.89) (0.84) (0.45) (0.88)
Collateral (-) -3.913*** -3.930*** -3.964*** -3.921***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Relative deal value (+) 1.031*** 0.999*** 2.482*** 1.015***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Diversifying takeover dummy (+/-) 0.261 0.287 0.295 0.269
(0.25) (0.21) (0.34) (0.24)
Constant 12.682*** 12.496*** 14.641*** 12.415***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Pseudo R 0.4262 0.4256 0.4447 0.4257
Observations 1218 1218 825 1218
Logistic estimation of the probability of using stock. This table reports the results of logistic regressions that examine how
excess cash reserve affects the propensity of using stock when a takeover offer is made. Sample period is 1999-2010. The
dependent variable is one for an all-stock offer and zero otherwise. Cross-listing dummy is one when the bidder firm is listed in
the target country. Target country investors is the number of shareholers in the target country. International sales is the
percentage of bidder foreign sales over total sales. Credit rating dummy is one if the bidder has a credit rating and zero
otherwise. Size is the logarithm of a bidder's book value of assets in million of euros. Log(market-to-book) is the logarithm if a
bidder's market-to-book ratio of equity. Profitability is a bidder's return on equity, calculated as net income income over book
value of equity. Relative deal value is deal value divided by bidder market value of equity. Diversifying takeover dummy is one
if a target operate in the same industry classified by 1-digit SIC codes and zero otherwise. Cross-border dummy is one if the
bidder and target domicile nations are different, zero otherwise. Inverse Mill's ratio refers to the ratio of the probability density
function to the cumulative distribution function of a distribution p-values are in parentheses. *,** and *** indicate significance
at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
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light of the announcement effect, cross-border acquisitions do not deviate significantly from 
domicile M&A cases, which signifies that bidder firm irrationality is increased in cross-border 
acquisitions. This is surprising, as the amount of uncertainty is inflated in foreign acquisitions, 
which gives basis to expect higher levels of bidder diligence. Cross-listing is not found to be a 
significant determinant of using equity. Even though the coefficient is positive and proximately 
significant at 10 percent, it cannot be decisively concluded to increase this probability. Similarly 
the number of shareholders and credit rating do not convey significance even though positive. On 
the other hand, international sales are seen positive and significant. High international 
concentration may be a result of small local markets or merely a mirror image of size, the 
increased probability of having sales in the target country is a determinant of using equity. 
Having sales in the target country increases the awareness of the bidder firm and therefore 
decreases the threshold of target firms to accept equity from the bidder. 
 
7.4 Comparing post-transaction operating performance with a matched firm sample 
 
I avoid the bias created because of a superior pre-event performance by comparing the 
performance of merging firms with those of matched firms. The approach is similar to that of 
Mikkelson and Partch (2002), where the authors concluded that there are no adverse effects of 
high liquid assets on corporate performance. Mikkelson and Partch (2002) find that firms with 
high liquid assets outperformed their peers, which gives basis to expect cash-rich firms 
experience more beneficial changes than non-cash rich firms. Firms are matched on acquiring 
and target firms’ performance (defined as cash flow to market value of assets) in year -1 from 
their respective industries. I use four criteria in matching cash rich firms in Sample (4) to non-
cash rich firms: 1) total assets between 50 percent and 150 percent; 2) same domicile country; 3) 
same 2-digit SIC code; and 4) revenues between 25 percent and 200 percent. I include all the 
firms that meet the set criteria and calculate averages for the peer group. I remove all firms, for 
which a peer group is not matched and consider thus a significantly smaller sample of firms. The 
number of peers naturally varies for each firm, where the peer group size varies from 1 to 12. 
Acknowledging this slightly distorts the sample towards firms domiciled in larger countries, 
where the pool of peer firms is larger, I impose a relative minimum number of peers- criteria 
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according to the respective pool set
27
. Sales and assets are matched from the year prior to the 
acquisition of the M&A firm. I obtaining the values I have utilized matrix calculation in order to 
achieve the correct the peers groups for each of the 691 firms included in Sample (4). The 
average is taken of the change and not the actual financial statement items. Out of the 80 cash 
rich firms in Sample 3, I retrieved a peer group for 45 percent (36 firms). 
 
Table 11 reports the differences in operating metrics for cash rich firms against their non-cash 
rich peers. Specifically, I use the equation Y = ln[(Vt -V0) /Total Assets0 ) + 1] to calculate 
changes for the different items measured. As I report differences in changes in financial statement 
items, a negative difference should be interpreted such that the change in cash rich firms is lower 
than that of non-cash rich firms. The method can be represented as: Difference CRi(Y) – 
NCRi(Y), where CRi is a cash rich firm and NCRi is a non-cash rich firm. The reason I report the 
differences and not a differentiated average of change for the peer sets is simply that averaging a 
change for the different firms does not convey the correct comparison: the sole purpose of the 
robustness test is to adjust for specific operating environments that cash rich firms and their peers 
endure. Taking the average of the changes and averaging them will not portray this correctly. 
 
Based on the results presented in Table 11, cash rich firms tend to adjust their cash reserve levels 
more than their non-cash rich peers. The change is especially significant during the first year after 
the acquisition, where the mean difference is 23.0 percent. The difference, however, moves in the 
opposite direction as time post-transaction is increased. This partially fortifies the findings in 
Section 6.4, where excess cash reserve is reported to have a negative relation with post-
acquisition uses of cash reserves. I mentioned previously there exists a negative relation between 
excess cash reserve and change in cash reserve for the four years post transaction. The peer set 
analysis underlines the fact that firms with excess cash diminish their cash reserves more than 
non-cash rich peers. The standard errors still imply that there is significant variance in the 
observed differences. As the peer groups are matched to account for the macroeconomic and 
industry changes, the use of cash reserve can be stated to be different depending on cash richness, 
but the validity of this conclusion is lessened by high variance.  
 
                                                 
27
 E.g. for the UK the number of peers is required to be at least five, whereas it is one for small countries such as 
Finland. 
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   Table 11: Matched firm analysis on post-acquisition uses of funds 
   
 
Reflecting on the operating cash flow of cash rich firms, the operational improvement is higher 
than the average of all firms included in Sample (4). The changes in operating cash flow for years 
2-4 are 2.7 percent, 8.9 percent, and 5.6 percent respectively. For non-cash rich firms the changes 
are lower throughout the three years. This is different from the findings of Opler (1999), where 
excess cash reserves were diminished due to operating losses. In my findings the cash reserve 
diminishes for cash rich firms while operating performance is improved. From the growth 
perspective, capital expenditure was stated to have a negative relation with excess cash. Based on 
Table 11, capital expenditure is higher for cash-rich firms throughout the four year inspection 
Exp. 
Sign
Mean Median
Standard 
deviation
Standard error
ΔCash 1 (-) -0.230 -0.234 0.389 0.108
2 (-) -0.079 -0.086 0.413 0.115
3 (-) 0.059 0.099 0.375 0.104
4 (-) 0.067 0.229 0.498 0.138
ƩLT Debt Reduction 1 (+) 0.081 0.054 0.420 0.116
2 (+) 0.145 0.046 0.237 0.066
3 (+) 0.241 0.112 0.512 0.142
4 (+) 0.106 0.107 0.258 0.072
ΔInventory 1 (+) 0.011 0.019 0.024 0.007
2 (+) 0.022 0.008 0.038 0.011
3 (+) 0.027 -0.003 0.055 0.015
4 (+) 0.059 0.048 0.088 0.024
ƩCAPEX 1 (+) 0.000 -0.014 0.091 0.025
2 (+) 0.013 0.007 0.089 0.025
3 (+) 0.001 -0.005 0.080 0.022
4 (+) 0.010 0.000 0.077 0.021
ƩOper.Costs 1 (-) -0.069 -0.148 0.413 0.115
2 (-) -0.218 -0.249 0.423 0.117
3 (-) -0.225 -0.190 0.419 0.116
4 (-) -0.302 -0.230 0.491 0.136
ƩAcquisitions 1 (+) -0.197 -0.186 0.173 0.048
2 (+) -0.136 -0.124 0.251 0.069
3 (+) -0.108 -0.071 0.180 0.050
4 (+) -0.067 -0.042 0.191 0.053
ƩTotal Assets 1 (+) 0.418 0.230 1.072 0.297
2 (+) 0.785 0.204 1.864 0.517
3 (+) 0.246 0.318 1.110 0.308
4 (+) 0.829 0.961 0.417 0.116
Relative post-acquisition uses of funds based on a mathced peer group. This table reports the differences in operating
performance of cash rich and non-cash rich bidders.The cash rich bidders are matched to a peer group of 1-12 firms and
differences in changes is calculated for each set of comparables. The metrics used to model operating performance are
modeled as Y = ln[(Vt -V0) /Total Assetso ) + 1] for V= cash, inventory and total assets, for t=1 to 4. t=0 denotes the year
before deal announcement, and t=1 to 4 are the 1st to the 4th year after deal completion. At t=0, total assets, cash, inventory
are the combined figures of bidder and target. At t=1 to 4, R&D, capital expenditure, long-term debt reduction, acquisitions,
cash, inventory and total assets are of the combined firm.
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period. I find this to be a function of the higher growth opportunities that are prevalent for cash-
rich firms. Opposite, the change in combined operating costs is lower for cash rich firms, which 
has again two opposite interpretations: 1) cost synergies are captured more effectively; 2) growth 
opportunities are not ventured. I base a considerable amount of my argumentation on the 
assumption that growth increases operating costs. Further, acquisitions are relatively smaller for 
cash rich firms as indicated by the negative sign throughout the four years, which implies that the 
propensity of cash rich firms to engage in new M&A activity is smaller than for their peers. 
Whether or not growth can be experienced while eluding increases in operating costs is 
debatable, I do not find sufficient evidence to assume the contrary. The robustness test essentially 
confirms my findings in Section 6.4, as excess cash reserves are negatively related to post-
acquisition cash reserves, while operating performance in enhancement and growth opportunities 
are not exploited. 
VIII. Summary and conclusions 
 
Rational choice theory is a framework for understanding and often modeling social and economic 
behavior. There has been several research papers established on the topic of capital structure and 
mergers and acquisitions. I find that the reason it has been so keenly investigated over the past 
half century is the fact that the results are found relatively often to contradict the hypothesis of 
rational behavior. It has been shown that managerial behavior cannot be captured in a function 
accounting for all different circumstances and factors. The frameworks constructed by Miller and 
Modigliani (1958), Myers and Majluf (1984), and Jensen (1986) are cited more often than most 
academic researchers, but still modern research is focused on finding more accurate ways to 
define the somewhat fundamental theories that were established many years ago. This thesis 
ventures in explaining firm and investor behavior in circumstances that may give rise to falsify 
assumptions made previously. The study has been largely motivated by Gao (2011), who finds 
that excess cash holdings do have effect on M&A parameters. In my study, I have provided a 
more elaborate approach on the subject with more recent data and different geographical focus. 
Having a European focus, the samples have liberated me to analyze differences across different 
legislation, i.e. Common Law versus Code Law. This approach is new in the context of using 
solely equity financed acquisitions in inspecting the differences between the two legislative areas. 
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Overall, my thesis is an attempt to portray a distinct area in corporate finance theory in European 
context. 
 
7.1  Main findings 
 
I use a similar approach as Gao (2011) in his paper, where the topic is segmented into three main 
areas: 1) bidder announcement of equity financed merger or acquisition; 2) the probability of 
using equity in mergers and acquisitions; 3) post-transaction performance of combined entity. 
Broadly speaking, the results are according to my hypotheses and theoretical frameworks. Table 
12 provides a concise summary of the main findings in each of the three areas. 
 
According to McCardle and Viswanathan (1994) and Jovanovic and Braguinsky (2002) market 
participants interpret equity offers as a negative signal about the firm’s true value. They base 
their argument on exhausted growth opportunities. Regardless of what the reasons are for the low 
announcement effect for stock bidders around the announcement, the fact most, if not all, 
researchers agree on is that equity offers underperform cash offers in the short-term. I show in 
this study that the negative price effect is more severe for cash rich firms and that the severity of 
the announcement effect is magnified along excess cash reserve. From the targets side, the 
estimation error of synergies is elevated in hot market conditions making them more apt to accept 
equity offers. The reasons lay in the signaled overvaluation that firms experience when 
theoretically cheaper sources of finance are available. Here, when there is uncertainty on the 
value of the bidders’ assets, information asymmetry assumes an important role. As monitoring 
costs are increased along excess cash reserves, the role of the transparency of assets is 
emphasized. I show evidence that the negative announcement effect is statistically diluted with 
high levels of transparency in bidders. The result fortifies Jensen’s free cash flow theory, as he 
argues that information asymmetry is the main reason for the negative announcement effect of an 
equity financed transaction.  
 
Comparing the two different legislations that prevail in the EU-15 countries, I find that bidder 
CARs are 0.29 percent higherin Common Law countries than in Code Law countries, which is 
according to the findings of La Porta et al. (1997). However, the results show that Common Law 
countries are more sensitive to adverse selection costs. In addition, the levitating effect of lower 
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asymmetries of information is also found to be more significant in Common Law countries. 
Reflecting this on the country characteristics, two conclusions may be made: 1) the negative 
effect of excess cash reserves is more apparent and statistically valid in Common Law countries; 
2) information asymmetry is in a pronounced role in countries where investor protection is better.  
 
Table 12: Summary of results 
 
 
Hyptohesis Evidence
Hypothesis 1.1: Excess cash reserves diminish post-
acquisition bidder returns in fully stock financed acquisitions 
A 1 percent increase in the excess cash ratio leads to a 27.4
basis point decrease in an average bidder's announcement
CAR. This finding contradicts the view that excess cash
reserve primarily reflects growth opportunities. In hot
equity markets, the negative announcement effect is
underlined as the average bidder announcement CAR
decreases by 28.7. 
Hypothesis 1.2: The negative effect of excess cash reserves
on bidder CARs is lessened with lower levels of information
asymmetry 
This effect is seen in the -0.349 coefficient for excess cash
reserve ratio and 0.464 coefficient for the HighT interacted
variable. Lowering the level of information asymmetry
enhances the investor reaction to an equity financed deal
Hypothesis 1.3: The negative effect of excess cash reserves
on bidder CARs is emphasized in Common Law countries
Common Law countries exhibit a more negative coefficient
(-0.322) for excess cash reserves, whereas Code Law
countries exhibit only -0.059. The abnormal return in
Common Law countries is 0.29 percent higher than in Code
Law countries.
Hypothesis 2.1: Excess cash reserves decrease the
probability of using stock as a method of payment in
acquisitions
The coefficient for log(1+excess cash ratio) is -6.229 and
statistically significant at 1 percent. The coefficient suggests 
that a one standard deviation increase in the variable reduces
the probability of using stock by 4.59 percent
Hypothesis 2.2: Cash rich firms are less likely to finance
cross-border acquisitions with equity than non-cash rich
firms
The coefficient on the cross-border dummy is 0.488. The
variable imposes a positive relation between the use of
equity and cross-border acquisition at five percent
significance
Hypothesis 2.3: Probability of using equity in M&A cases is
increased for both cash rich and non-cash rich firms in
Common Law countries
Probability of using equity in Common Law countries
demonstrates higher sensitivity to excess cash reserve as the
probability decrease of using equity is 2.00 percent per one
standard deviation
Hypothesis 3.1: Post-acquisition bidder operating cash flow
performance is better for cash rich firms
Operating costs are significantly negatively related to excess
cash reserves throughout the four year period.
Simultaneously operating cash flow is increasing for all firms
which implies a postive relation in exccess cash and
operating performance.
Hypothesis 3.2: Cash reserve is decreasing for cash-rich
firms post transaction
The first two year post the transaction, excess cash has a
negative impact on cash reserve (-1.034 and -0.493
respectively), implying that cash reserve tends towards
normal levels.
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Regarding the probability of using equity in M&A cases, I find evidence that excess cash 
reserves lower this probability at 1 percent significance. The marginal effect of one standard 
deviation change in the excess cash ratio reduces the probability of using equity by 4.59 percent. 
The availability of internal funds is therefore echoed in the financing decisions made by 
managers and exhibits rational behavior. In context of irrationality, I find that 85 cash rich firms 
use equity as a payment method. This behavior is partially explained by industry and GDP 
growths, as cash reserves are maintained high due to prevailing growth opportunities. The 
findings for hot- and non-hot markets are not as candid: one standard deviation change in excess 
cash reduces the probability of using equity in non-hot equity markets by 5.59 percent, while  
it reduces the probability by only 3.99 percent in hot equity markets. If cash reserves are seen 
more valuable in economic troughs the use of other payment methods should be emphasized. The 
results convey that the overvaluation component in hot equity markets trump the increased value 
of cash reserves in non-hot markets. The off-setting implication of the market overvaluation and 
cash reserve value is more pronounced in non-hot markets than in hot markets. I provide also 
evidence that the results vary across industries and GDP growths. I find that the negative effect of 
excess cash reserves is more pronounced in high growth environments and in industries where 
capital requirements are lower. Where most results are according to my hypothesis and previous 
findings, the effect of cross-border acquisitions is contradictory. As reported by Grinblatt and 
Keloharju (2001), shareholders are more likely to hold equity in domicile firms, which implies 
that foreign equity would not be accepted by managements and boards in M&A cases. I present, 
however, that cross-border acquisitions increase the likelihood of using equity as payment 
method. Correcting the model for sampling bias lowers the positive effect, but still remains 
positive and significant. This result is not explained by cross-listings, investor presence or credit 
ratings, but international sales are found to affect the probability positively.  
 
When differentiating between the two different legislative areas, the results show that Common 
Law countries demonstrate higher sensitivity to excess cash reserves in respect of equity 
financing. While the Logit regression provides results that imply sensitivities to the contrary, the 
marginal effects demonstrate the impact on the probability of using equity to be higher in 
Common Law countries. I find that a one standard deviation increase in excess cash reserve ratio 
decreases the probability of using equity by 2.00 percent in Common Law countries while the 
decrease is only 1.40 percent in Code Law countries. Market orientation, higher investor 
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protection, more dispersed ownership, and lower levels of state involvement are seen as basis for 
the findings.  
 
Operating performance is tested in this thesis by inspecting the four year performance of equity 
bidders. Excess cash reserves are negatively related to the changes in cash reserves, which imply 
that cash holdings are adjusted towards normal levels post transactions. This follows my 
hypothesis, as capital structures have been reported to tend toward optimal levels regarding 
corporate leverage. I do not find evidence that cash richness could be used a synonym for growth, 
as the metrics used to depict growth, operating costs, acquisitions and capital expenditures are 
likewise negatively related to excess cash reserve ratios. The operating performance is, though, 
stated to improve along cash richness, which captures the synergistic gains aspect of M&A cases 
that have strong signalling effects. I derive at this conclusion through triangulation: as operating 
costs are negatively related to excess cash reserves while operating cash flows are reported to 
increase after equity financed acquisitions, it can be stated that excess cash reserves are positively 
related to operating performance. Relative to a matched, non-cash rich peer group, cash rich firms 
are seen to diminish cash reserves more and improve operational efficiency more than their peers.  
 
7.2  Conclusions and suggestions for further research 
 
The main findings in my thesis shed light on theories such as adverse selection costs, information 
asymmetry, Pecking Order theory, and Trade-off theory. In the specific circumstances measured 
in the tests, I provide results that both contemplate and contradict these highly valued theories. 
Excess cash, a source of financial flexibility and internal resource, is shown to have negative 
implications on equity financing decisions. Whether the off-setting variables, such as growth 
versus financial flexibility, are assumed to act simultaneously on firm value, I provide evidence 
that the off-setting force, adverse selection of cash, is more pronounced. I find that the state of the 
market affects investor perceptions on how firms finance M&A cases. Overvaluation is reported 
to affect both target firm and investors perception of the intrinsic value of the bidder, as the 
signaling effect of cash rich firms is underlined in good market conditions. The differences 
between different legislations has been proven to also be a factor in determining corporate 
behavior, where countries with better investor protection, more dispersed ownership, and more 
favorable M&A taxation directives, use equity more freely as means of payment. Post- 
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acquisition performance is similarly affected by adverse selection of cash holdings has been 
proven to affect firm and investor behavior. 
 
Ownership, indicated to be an important factor in corporate finance issues, is overlooked in this 
study. As mentioned in the limitations section, the retrieval of reliable data on firm ownership 
would require vast amounts of hand-picking, which acted as the main constraint for it to be 
included in this study. When optimal behavior is inspected, it would be essential to include 
controlling variables that have been stated to affect this behavior. Based on my results I can 
conclude that rationality is not always enforced, as value destroying ventures are partaken. 
However, there are certain ownership aspects that may contribute in explaining this irrationality. 
Dilution of control, as reported by Amihud et al. (1990), Stulz (1988), and Jung, Kim and Stulz 
(1986) is a significant determinant on the likelihood of using equity financing. Similarly, 
managerial ownership, stated by Martin (1996) and Ghosh and Ruland (1998) is seen as a 
variable affecting financing decisions. Where I have presented results that account for legislative 
differences in M&A specific directives, the differences in ownership structure could be used to 
test the M&A outcomes across different legislations. I have built-on the findings of La Porta 
(1997) in explaining my results, but there would be need to fortify the relatively dated 
assumptions made in this thesis. 
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APPENDIX A: Mergers and acquisitions terminology 
 
Below, I provide a summary of terminology used in this thesis. The table terms that I find need 
scrutiny, as may be used interchangeably. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Term Definition
Acquisition A purchase of an unspecified interest in a firm, generally via a tender offer for target
shares. Used interchangeably with the terms M&A case.
Adverse selection cost The term refers to a market process in which 'bad' results occurs when buyers and targets
have asymmetric information.
Bidder A firm that engages in M&A activity with the intention to buy an unspecified stake in the
target firm
Cash rich firm Derived from a method used by Opler et al. (1999). Cash richness is observed if the excess
cash ratio exceeds 92nd percentile in respective sample.
Equity financing Capital raised from equity capital markets. Used interchangeably with external equity and
stock financing.
Information asymmetry A situation where one party in a M&A case has more or better information than the
other. In this study information asymmetry is measured by proportion of tangible assets of
total assets
M&A case A common abbreviation for mergers and acquisitions.An event where a firm buys a stake in 
another firm. The term is used free of payment method and interchangeably with the term
acquisition.
Offer The term is used as a synonym for a merger or acquisition. It is used to convey the method
of payment when uncertainty of the completion of a transaction is still prevalent. The
reader may assume though that the 'offer' term is used knowing the offer is succesful.
Target Refers to a firm that another firm has succesfully bought a stake in. 
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APPENDIX B: Variable definitions 
 
Below, I provide a summary of the definitions of variables used in this thesis. The table includes 
all the variables used in the main tests and robustness tests. 
 
 
Variable Definition
Average sales growth Calculated as the average sales growth of a firm during four years prior to the M&A event. 
CAPEX Capital epxenditures deflated by total assets. Measured from the latest available annual report prior to 
the M&A event.
Cash reserve ratio Cash and marketable securities over total assets measured from the latest available annual report prior 
to M&A event.
Credit Rating dummy Set as one if the bidder has a credit rating from Moody's, Standard and Poor's, or Fitch in the year 
prior to the M&A case.
Cross-border acquisitions A M&A case where the bidder and target are domiciled in different countries. 
Cross-listing dummy A bidder listed in the exchange of the target country.
Collateral Measured as book value of tangible assets over total assets. Measured from the latest avaible annual 
reprot prior to M&A event.
Diversifying deals A M&A case where the bidder and target operate in different industries measured from 
ThomsonReuters SIC-codes. 
Excash The difference between cash reserve ratio and its required level calculated according to Opler (1999). 
The cash reserve ratio is measured from the latest available annual report prior to M&A event.
International sales The proportion of total sales that are generated in countries different than the domicile country of 
the firm.
Leverage The industry average leverage in a certain year. Measured as long-term debt over total assets.
Market-to-book ratio The market value of equity deflated by the book value of equity measrured at the day of 
announcement.
Overpay Measuring the target shareholder's gain relative to bidder market value of equity, which is calculated 
by first taking the product of CAR, target market value of equity and the percentage of target stake 
sought by the bidder, and then dividing this product by bidder market value of equity. All metrics are 
Measured from the latest avaible annual reprot prior to M&A event.
Operating cash flow Cash flows generated by the operative actions of a firm. Measured from the latest available annual 
report prior to the M&A event.
Presence in target country The number of bidder shareholders domiciled in the country of the target firm.
Profitability Calculated as net income over book value of equity as reported in the latest avaible annual report 
prior to M&A event.
Relative deal value Deal value deflated by pre-acquisition bidder market value of assets measured as the sum of marke 
value of equity and book value of debt. Book value of debt retrieved from the latest available annual 
report prior to the M&A event.
Size The logarithm of a bidder's pre-acquisition book value of total assets in millions of euros. Measured 
from the latest avaible annual reprot prior to M&A event.
Total fund The sum of funds from operations, sales of property, plant and equipment, sale of common and 
preferred stock, long-term debt issuances, and other sources of funds, aggregated over the 
corresponding horizons.
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APPENDIX C: Control variables correlation matrices 
 
I include the correlation matrices in order to provide basis for control variable selection. The 
models used in this study were formalized in relation to avoid autocorrelation and based on the 
matrix tables, this was achieved. There are no two variables that would be correlated over 0.6 
units (Panel A, Market-to-book and Operating cash flow). 
 
 
Panel A: Correlation matrix of variables used in bidder announcement effect
log(1+excess 
cash reserve)
Market-to-
book
log(sales) Profitability Overpay
Operating  
cash flow
Relative 
deal value
Diversifying 
deal
Cross-
border deal
log(1+excess cash reserve) 1
Market-to-book -0.7091 1
log(sales) -0.1701 -0.1427 1
Profitability -0.2574 0.1481 0.1560 1
Overpay 0.1107 0.0097 -0.1376 0.0696 1
Operating  cash flow -0.5187 0.5552 0.2951 0.5488 -0.0028 1
Relative deal value 0.1589 0.1878 -0.3001 -0.3110 0.0755 0.0904 1
Diversifying deal -0.0839 0.0612 -0.0349 -0.0264 0.0165 0.1295 -0.0709 1
Cross-border deal 0.0523 0.0560 0.0506 -0.0843 0.3513 -0.1009 0.1297 -0.1530 1
Panel B: Correlation matrix of variables used in probability of using equity in M&A cases
log(1+excess 
cash reserve)
log(market-
to-book)
Avrg. Sales 
grwth.
log(sales) Leverage Collateral
Relative 
deal value
Diversifying 
deal
Cross-
border deal
log(1+excess cash reserve) 1
log(market-to-book) -0.4081 1
Avrg. Sales grwth. 0.0351 -0.0028 1
log(sales) -0.0815 0.0174 -0.0054 1
Leverage 0.0019 -0.0344 -0.0354 0.1309 1
Collateral -0.0269 -0.0101 -0.0365 0.2641 0.2215 1
Relative deal value -0.0106 0.0008 0.0050 -0.1750 -0.0242 -0.0405 1
Diversifying deal -0.0237 0.0295 0.0028 -0.0137 -0.0210 -0.0779 0.0161 1
Cross-border deal -0.0018 -0.0063 0.0078 0.1477 -0.0047 0.0302 -0.0384 -0.0395 1
Panel C: Correlation matrix of variables used in post-acquisition operating performance
log(1+excess 
cash reserve)
log(1+cash 
ratio)
Total fund Size Relative 
deal value
log(1+excess cash reserve) 1
log(1+cash ratio) -0.1967 1
Total fund -0.3039 0.2677 1
Size 0.1928 -0.3295 -0.0929 1
Relative deal value -0.0218 0.0656 -0.0223 -0.1366 1
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APPENDIX D: Survey results for cash holding rationale 
 
Lins et al. (2010) conduct a survey to 200 corporate managers in trying to find reasons for cash 
holdings. I present the summary results table from their paper in order to provide reasoning for 
my research question from a non-quantitative angle. The table reports answers to the question: 'In 
deciding how much excess cash to hold, how important the following factors are?' Scale is Not 
important (0) to very important (5). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
% 4 or 5 score Mean score
Number of 
respondents
Cash as a buffer against future cash flow shortfalls 47 3.04 188
Minimal cash ensures efficient running of the company 35 2.57 182
Difference between interest rate on cash and interest rate on debt 35 2.50 184
Time it  takes to raise money when funds are needed 31 2.43 187
Level of uncertainty about future investment opportunities 31 2.36 186
Ability to issue debt at a 'fairä price when funds are needed 30 2.29 187
Difference between interest rate on cash and cost of capital 26 2.19 182
Size of the undrawn credit facility 23 2.06 182
Transaction costs of raising funds 22 1.96 184
Difference between interest rate in cash and return on other projects 19 1.93 181
Ability to issue equity at 'fair price when funds are needed 19 1.77 181
Using cash to retire debt moves company below target debt level 18 1.64 181
Tax that shareholders would pay if company paid out cash 13 1.48 183
Preference of controlling shareholders 13 1.40 182
Rating agency requirements 12 1.45 179
Signals associated with drawing down the undrawn credit facility 10 1.49 174
Other lender requirements 10 1.23 180
Regulatory requirements 9 1.13 178
Contingent capital (e.g. possible future litigation exposures) 8 1.37 179
Ability to take on projects even if they do not add value to the firm 8 1.08 182
Cannot apply cash to retire debt without incurring accounting charges 7 1.39 176
Cash holdings of other companies in my industry 4 1.21 182
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APPENDIX E: Marginal effects of variables on probability of using stock 
 
When comparing Common Law and Code Law countries, I found significant differences in 
marginal effects. The relations between firm characteristics and using equity differ between the 
two legislative areas and therefore I present the marginal effects as a separate figure. Marginal 
effect on probability of using equity financing of one standard deviation increase in underlying 
explanatory variable. 
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